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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
BANKRUPTCY AND EXIT MECHANISMS IN COLOMBIA 
 
 
By 
 
 
Igor Esteban Zuccardi Huertas 
 
 
 
 
 
Recent literature has paid attention to the economic effects of bankruptcy laws. 
Even though the literature states that these laws should be adjusted to each country’s 
individual economic characteristics, in general they should be based on some 
economic criteria to decide whether a firm has to be either restructured or liquidated. 
They should give transparent and consistent rules for negotiation that balance 
creditors’ and debtors’ rights, and they should try to make the processes easier and 
less time-consuming in order to maintain the economic value of ailing firms. 
This thesis evaluates Law 550, the Colombian bankruptcy law passed in 1999. 
With information from 50 firms with restructuring agreements and 10 companies in 
liquidation, I analyze their bargaining processes to show the law’s principal strengths 
and weaknesses. I found that Law 550 has improved the Colombian bankruptcy 
system by making the restructuring process more flexible and less time-consuming. In 
addition, it improved firms’ management quality through the Code of Corporate 
Conduct for Businesses (Codigo de conducta empresarial).  
However, its shortcomings are that it does not contemplate any explicit ex-post 
 ii 
efficiency condition, and it has been a restructuring-oriented law: it does not give any 
explicit priority to order of payments; it reduces the minimum level needed to approve 
a restructuring plan; and gives veto power to minority groups interested in reaching a 
restructuring agreement. In addition, it is a debtor-oriented law, eliminating sanctions 
on owners and managers responsible for the firm’s bankruptcy. 
Law 550 is a temporary solution that must be changed at the end of 2004. 
Consequently, a new bankruptcy law for Colombia should focus on improving the ex-
ante and ex-post efficiency of bankruptcy procedures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
In capitalist economies, competition among firms drives the economy to a long-
run equilibrium, in which only the most efficient firms share the market. In this 
process, the inefficient firms must exit the market because they are unable to pay the 
return on resources used and go bankrupt. Consequently, the best option for society is 
to liquidate these companies and use their capital, land and labor for more efficient 
activities.  
However, in some circumstances, some efficient firms are unable to pay the return 
on their resources. Bad debt-schedule planning, a recessive business cycle or an 
unexpected shock to the industry, among other causes, can result in firms with good 
financial prospects being unable to pay their debts in a certain moment. In these cases, 
the cost to society to dismantle these firms is very high because the return on their 
resources that they can achieve in the future is larger than their opportunity cost. In 
other words, the price of these firms as a whole is bigger than the sum of the price of 
their parts.  
When a society faces these two different circumstances, it needs a legal system 
and an institutional structure that show how to proceed in such situations. For those 
cases, a bankruptcy law becomes a legal tool that helps society find solutions to 
situations of insolvency, resolve conflicts among debtors and creditors, enforce 
private contracts and look for the best allocation of economic resources.  
Ideally, a bankruptcy mechanism should encourage the reorganization of firms 
whose liquidation value (value of their parts) is smaller than their value as a going 
concern (value of the firms as a whole), and the liquidation of companies for which 
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the opposite is true. In addition, in case of reorganization, this mechanism should 
encourage rapid resolution of financial distress, because the longer a firm stays in 
bankruptcy, the greater the loss of value and the more difficult it becomes to 
rehabilitate the company and pay off its creditors. On the other hand, in case of 
liquidation, a speedy and organized dismantlement of the firm is socially desirable 
because the firm’s resources have opportunity costs that increase over time.  
Nevertheless, according to Aghion et al (1992), the actual bankruptcy mechanisms 
have shortcomings that leave them far from ideal. For example, these procedures 
involve significant legal and administrative costs and can take up a great deal of time. 
In addition, since shareholders and creditors own a small fraction of the equity and 
debts, they are unable to devote the socially efficient level of resources toward 
figuring out which plan is best for the company. Moreover, particularly with the 
bankruptcy procedure in the USA (Chapter 11) but similar to other countries, these 
mechanisms place considerable discretion in the hands of the judge, who may misuse 
it. Finally, because of the private interest of each part during the bargaining process, 
the firm may emerge with an inappropriate financial structure.1 
 Like other countries, Colombia had two bankruptcy procedures until 1999. The 
first, the concordato, was basically a financial reorganization procedure designed to 
reach a conciliatory agreement between a company experiencing financial difficulties 
and its creditors, with the purpose of rehabilitating the debtor’s business. The second, 
the quiebra, was simply a liquidation procedure in which the bankrupted firm’s assets 
were sold and the proceeds distributed to creditors. As in other countries, these 
procedures were considered costly and demanded long periods of time. For instance, 
an agreement among parties was difficult to reach and these procedures could take 
two years before reaching a resolution. In addition, these mechanisms were 
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insufficient to handle the massive number of bankruptcies of firms and local 
governments that occurred in the recession of 1999. Consequently, the Colombian 
Government reformed these procedures through Law 550, or ley de intervencion 
economica, with the purpose of making the reorganization and liquidation processes 
easier and keeping the employment in the restructured firms. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Colombian bankruptcy mechanism 
established by Law 550. I want to show the principal strengths and weaknesses of this 
law based on the theory of bankruptcy, as well as how it performed between 2000 and 
2003. Law 550 was conceived as a temporary mechanism to solve bankruptcies until 
the end of 2004, when the Colombian Parliament has to decide whether to make it 
permanent legislation or revert to the previous system. Consequently, an evaluation of 
its strengths and weaknesses will help determine which elements can be improved. 
This paper is organized as follows: in section two, I explain the basic issues about 
bankruptcy mechanisms and their main goals, the participant groups in the negotiating 
processes, their incentives and expected behaviors. In section three, I explain the 
historical context in which Law 550 was introduced, describing some topics of the 
previous bankruptcy mechanisms. In addition, I make a brief description of that law, 
its purposes and some descriptive results. Later on, an empirical evaluation of some 
restructuring processes under Law 550 is shown. The last section is the conclusion.  
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II. BASIC ISSUES ABOUT INSOLVENCY MECHANISMS, PARTICIPANT 
GROUPS, INCENTIVES AND EXPECTED BEHAVIORS 
A. BASIC ISSUES ABOUT INSOLVENCY MECHANISMS 
 
According to Nam and Oh (2000), “an insolvency mechanism is usually superior to 
individual debt collection mechanisms because it can lead to an increase in the 
economic value of a bankruptcy firm that can be distributed to creditors and debtors 
by limiting creditor’s ability to collect their claims individually.”2  
When a bankruptcy mechanism does not exist, a creditor has two main legal 
remedies to collect his loans: first, in case of a secured loan, the creditor can seize the 
assets that serve as collateral for the loan; second, in the case of an unsecured loan, 
the creditor can call on the court to sell some of the debtor’s assets. Nevertheless, in 
many cases the debtor’s assets are not enough to cover his liabilities; consequently, 
creditors will try to be first to recover their debts. The competition among creditors 
first may cause them to expend resources in an attempt to be the first to seize their 
collateral or to obtain a judgment against the debtor. Secondly, it may lead to the 
dismantlement of the firm’s assets with a loss of value for all creditors and 
stakeholders.  
In addition, when the value of a debtor firm as a going concern exceeds its 
liquidation value, the race among creditors may result in the liquidation of firms that 
could be profitable in the future and the allocation of the firm’s economic resources to 
other, less lucrative sectors. Therefore, it is in the collective interest of creditors and 
society to see that, if the debtor firm’s value as a going concern is larger than its 
liquidation value, the firm continues working with a new debt structure. If the firm 
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does not continue, it is in the collective interest of creditors and society to see that the 
the debtor’s assets are distributed in an orderly manner, via a bankruptcy mechanism. 
According to Hart (2000),3 a good bankruptcy procedure must achieve three 
goals: 
First, it should deliver an ex-post efficient outcome; it should maximize the total 
value available for division among the debtor, creditors and possibly other interested 
parties. A firm should be reorganized, sold for cash as a going concern, or shut down 
and liquidated piecemeal according to which of these options produces the greatest 
total value and most improves the welfare of the parties and society (ex-post 
efficiency condition). 
Second, a good bankruptcy procedure should preserve the bonding role of debt by 
penalizing managers and shareholders adequately when bankruptcy occurs. When a 
firm borrows money, it also acquires a commitment to pay off its debts in a certain 
period. If this promise is not fulfilled, this behavior should be punished by wiping out 
the shareholders’ claims, which makes the managers less likely to maintain their jobs, 
etc. These kinds of punishments are important because, without any adverse 
consequences, there are few incentives for the firm to pay its debts. 
Finally, a good bankruptcy procedure should preserve the absolute priority of 
claims, except that some portion of value should possibly be reserved for shareholders. 
A simple way to penalize shareholders in bankruptcy is to respect the absolute priority 
of claims (i.e., senior creditors are paid off first, then junior creditors, and finally 
shareholders). In addition, this absolute priority has other advantages. First, it helps to 
ensure that creditors receive a reasonable return even in the event of a declaration of 
bankruptcy, which encourages them to lend. Second, it means that bankruptcy and 
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solvency are not treated as fundamentally different states: contractual obligations 
entered into during solvency are respected to the fullest extent possible during 
bankruptcy. However, it is necessary to reserve some portion of value in bankruptcy 
for shareholders because, if they receive nothing in bankruptcy, then management, 
acting on behalf of shareholders, will have an incentive to “go for broke,” meaning 
they will do anything to avoid bankruptcy, including undertaking highly risky 
investment projects and delaying a bankruptcy filing. 
On the other hand, Nam and Oh (2000) consider that any bankruptcy mechanism 
must address the following three fundamental issues: 1) what to do with the firm itself 
(i.e., whether to liquidate or restructure); 2) how to restructure (liquidate) the firm if it 
is to be restructured (liquidated); and, 3) how to divide the economic value of the firm 
among various stakeholders during liquidation or restructuring.  
For the first issue, these authors consider that any bankruptcy procedure should, in 
principle, follow the ex-post efficiency condition. In other words, they say that it is 
desirable to liquidate a firm when the liquidation value is greater than the going-
concern value, and vice versa. For the second issue, they suggest that the bankruptcy 
procedure should look to maximize the value of the firm regardless of the choice 
between restructuring and liquidation.  
Finally, they recommend that, during liquidation procedures, assets of the firm 
should be auctioned off and the proceeds distributed to the stakeholders according to a 
previously-fixed rule, such as the absolute priority rule. In case of restructuring, 
however, the division of economic value can be achieved through debt-equity swaps, 
in which creditors receive shares of the firm in return for forgoing parts of the loans. 
Due to the fact that these debt-equity swaps generally increase the gross economic 
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value of the firm, it is necessary for creditors who participate in swaps to receive the 
part of the increase in the firm’s value that corresponds to the firm’s shares owned as a 
result of this procedure. Therefore, the old shareholders end up owning a smaller 
share of the firm, which now has a larger value. 
Although Nam and Oh (2000) state that these are the most desirable principles to 
take into account when designing a bankruptcy procedure, they also highlight other 
elements to consider. For example, they consider that the way in which the value of an 
insolvent firm is divided and the fate of the firm determine some ex-ante behaviors of 
the parties (ex-ante efficiency).  
In the first case, what happens to the debts during bankruptcy determines the 
degree of risk-sharing by lenders and equity investors at a stage at which decisions on 
lending and equity participation are made. Consequently, the structure of the 
insolvency proceeding can affect the supply of credit in financial markets and the 
equilibrium prices for credits.  
In the second case, the bankruptcy mechanism affects the behavior of creditors 
and debtors, particularly in terms of limited liability. The authors add that the results 
of the bankruptcy proceeding can determine the resources that creditors use to screen 
activities during the lending stage and later the monitoring stage. In addition, the 
shareholders and managers have incentives to choose their actions based on outcomes 
expected to be realized during bankruptcy (such as incentives to gamble on an “all-or-
nothing” strategy when they expect very bad payoffs during bankruptcy), or looking 
to be indispensable in the state of bankruptcy.  
In sum, an ideal bankruptcy mechanism should guarantee that its result fulfills the 
ex-post efficiency condition: 1) maximize the economic value of the firm no matter its 
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fate (liquidation or restructuring), and 2) restructure a firm if, and only if, its going-
concern value is greater than the liquidation value, and vice versa. In addition, this 
procedure should internalize changes in the parties’ behavior produced by possible 
results, and it should adequately penalize managers and shareholders in a state of 
bankruptcy to preserve the bonding role of debt. Finally, for the process of division of 
economic value, it is desirable for the mechanism to include any fixed rule that 
respects the acquired rights of the creditors (i.e. the absolute-priority-of-claims rule) 
while reserving some portion of value for shareholders, and to include the possibility 
of debt-equity swaps. 
 
B. DIFFERENT KINDS OF BANKRUPTCY MECHANISMS 
 
In actuality, the ex-ante and ex-post efficiency objectives that any bankruptcy 
mechanism tries to achieve involve a tradeoff: the expected outcomes of a bankruptcy 
procedure could affect the ex-ante behavior of the interested parties, and these 
behaviors can influence the mechanism’s final outcome. In an effort to balance these 
two objectives, governments have developed various types of bankruptcy procedures.  
Aghion, Philippe et al. (1992) and Nam and Oh (2000) have arranged bankruptcy 
procedures into four main groups based on the mechanism by which the firm’s 
reorganization is determined: 1) Decision by a Single Authority, 2) Formal Bargaining 
Games, 3) Informal Bargaining Games and 4) Automatic financial restructuring. 
1) Decision by a Single Authority: In this mechanism, a central entity 
(Government) has the best information about the economic environment 
surrounding an insolvent firm; consequently, it can determine the optimal 
strategy for restructuring or liquidating the firm and the optimal division of 
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value among stakeholders.  
Even though this mechanism would be ideal, it is based on an unrealistic 
assumption. There is no central entity with the best information; therefore, it 
does not know the best way to restructure or liquidate an ailing firm. In 
addition, its incentives and objectives could be different from those of the 
stakeholders. 
2) Formal Bargaining Games: In this mechanism, the fate of an ailing firm is 
determined by a bargaining process among stakeholders with some formal 
rules. These rules generally include protecting the firm’s assets from attempts 
to collect debt by creditors, classifying creditors according to some prioritized 
order, drawing up reorganization plans, and establishing voting mechanisms. 
The advantage of this mechanism is that stakeholders, who have the best 
information about the firm, can participate in the restructuring process. Each 
party tries to maximize their respective objective in a non-cooperative game, 
while accounting for the fact that the others are doing the same. However, 
heterogeneity of information and varying attitudes toward risk among 
stakeholders could result in negotiations with non-optimal outcomes (i.e. non-
viable firms continue working, and vice versa). In addition, it is difficult to 
design a bargaining process that always distributes the firm’s value in an 
optimal way. Finally, this mechanism is time-consuming and costly, which 
reduces the firm’s value. 
3) Informal Bargaining Games: In this mechanism, stakeholders can reach a deal 
outside the rules of the formal bargaining games. Even though this mechanism 
can facilitate the process of a firm’s reorganization, it is restricted to the 
possible results of formal proceedings because no stakeholder is willing to 
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receive less payment than they would in the formal games. In addition, there is 
Pareto superiority in the formal bargaining games . 
4) Automatic Financial Restructuring: In this mechanism, all the firm’s debts and 
equities are swapped according to an option scheme based on the absolute 
priority rule. Each stakeholder can exercise their options to buy the firm’s 
equities or sell their shares (options) to other stakeholders or in the market. 
This procedure has two advantages: i) it can improve the financial profile of 
the ailing firms because their debts are converted into equities, and ii) 
creditors and shareholders become part of the same side because both of them 
have the same incentives in maintaining the viability of the ailing firms. This 
mechanism has been proposed by academic researchers, but it has not been 
applied in any country yet.4 
Law 550 can be considered an example of a formal bargaining procedure. Under 
this law, different stakeholders participate in bargaining games with some rules that 
determine their behaviors. Each stakeholder has their own objectives and incentives to 
maximize in a non-cooperative game. Thus, the next subsection explains who the 
participants in the bargaining process are, their objectives, and their incentives. 
 
C. PARTICIPANT PARTIES, INCENTIVES AND BEHAVIORS 
 
In a corporate restructuring, there are five different stakeholders’ groups that 
participate in the negotiation under a formal bargaining game. Each group has its own 
objectives and incentives, and each one tries to maximize them in a non-cooperative 
game with limited information about the firm’s conditions. These groups are: a) 
  11
shareholders and managers; b) current and retired workers; c) government; d) secured 
creditors; and e) unsecured creditors and other creditors. 
a) Shareholders and managers: They are the owners of the firm’s equity. In micro, 
small and medium-size firms, it is common for shareholders to be in charge of 
the company’s management, but in large companies, management and 
ownership usually are separated.  
In general, shareholders and managers are interested in maximizing the 
firm’s value and their benefit. However, this is not a homogeneous group. 
There are three subgroups—dominant shareholders, minority shareholders and 
managers— that, in certain circumstances, have contradictory incentives:  
• Dominant shareholders have two objectives: i) maximizing the firm’s 
value and ii) increasing their percentage in the firm’s ownership. 
Therefore, in the event of a corporate restructuring, they would be 
interested in keeping the firm working, and when ownership reform 
occurs (i.e. share issue, new capitalization, etc), they would tend to protect 
their rights, thereby affecting the minority shareholders’ rights.   
• Minority shareholders have two objectives: i) maximizing the firm’s value 
and ii) protecting their rights in the firm’s ownership. Therefore, in the 
event of a corporate restructuring, they would also be interested in 
keeping the firm working. In addition, they would push for a corporate 
governance agreement that protects their ownership rights. 
• Managers have as objectives maintaining their jobs and the firm’s 
management. In general, this objective is achieved if managers maximize 
the firm’s value (measured by the shares’ price in the market, etc.), but in 
financial distress, managers could have other incentives. According to 
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White (2001),5 in times of crisis, managers have an incentive to use the 
firm’s assets inefficiently. Since the value of the financially-distressed 
firm’s equity amounts to zero in liquidation, managers no longer have an 
incentive to behave in the interest of shareholders. Then, they could: i) 
strip the firm of its most valuable assets by transferring these assets at a 
low price to new firms that the managers control, and/or ii) use the firm’s 
capital to make risky investments with a low probability of a high payoff. 
In the last case, managers are encouraged to play an “all-or-nothing” 
gamble that has a low probability of saving the firm: if they win the 
gamble, they would receive a high return that would help them save the 
firm; otherwise, the gamble would leave managers and equity no worse 
off than they would have been anyway.  
As shown above, amid financial distress, shareholders and managers can 
have different purposes and incentives. This is the main feature of a “principal-
agent relationship,” which generates problems of moral hazard and could 
produce bargaining outcomes that are economically inefficient.  
b) Current and retired workers: They are stakeholders whose main income is 
salaries and wages received from the firm. When the firm goes bankrupt, their 
main objective is to maintain employment and wages with the same privileges 
as in normal circumstances. However, since their main (and in most cases, 
only) source of income is their jobs, they are interested in keeping their 
employment in order to guarantee their present and future incomes. 
Consequently, during a restructuring process, they are interested in keeping the 
firm working. 
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c) Government: When a firm goes bankrupt, it usually has debts with the 
government (i.e. unpaid taxes, social security contributions, etc). Consequently, 
the main objective of government is to recover these debts, whether the firm is 
viable or not.  
d) Secured creditors: They hold a firm’s assets as collateral for their credits (i.e. 
financial creditors, banks, etc). When a firm goes bankrupt, their objective is 
to recover their credits and unpaid interest through the liquidation of the firm’s 
collateral. Therefore, in a bargaining process, they would only be interested in 
keeping the firm working if the proceeds they can collect in that scenario are 
larger than the value of the collateral.  
They are usually not interested in the firm’s fate because they habitually cut 
any financial relationship with the ailing firm after a default episode. However, 
if their rights are not correctly protected during the bargaining process, no 
potential creditors will be willing to lend to the firm in the future. The 
treatment of creditors’ claims, when the firm defaults, affects creditors’ overall 
return, and thus their incentive to lend. 
Unsecured creditors: They do not hold a firm’s assets as collateral for its credits. Their 
objective is to recover their loans and the unpaid interest. Nevertheless, there is a 
group of unsecured creditors related to the firm’s business cycle (i.e., input suppliers), 
and another group that is not related (i.e., financial institutions without collateral). The 
former group is not only interested in recovering its resources, but also in preserving a 
relationship with the firm if the association benefits both parties. The latter is only 
interested in recovering its resources. Therefore, only the former group would be 
interested in keeping the firm working.   
III. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE IN 
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COLOMBIA AND DESCRIPTION OF THE LAW 
 
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE IN 
COLOMBIA 
 
In 1991, Colombia began its process of economic liberalization. For 40 years, 
Colombian economic growth was rooted in an Import Substitution Industrialization 
model and an Export Promotion Policy. Its presence in the world capitalist system 
was based principally on its exports of coffee, oil and coal. But in 1991, some 
economic studies reported that without an International Openness Policy, the 
country’s economic growth rate of 5% was no longer viable. Total factor productivity 
was declining, and the rupture of the International Coffee Agreement affected the 
supply of foreign currency into the economy.  
In response, the government carried out a series of economic policy changes to 
deregulate the Colombian economy, called Apertura (Openness). During the first half 
of the 1990s, the trade balance and the capital account were liberalized. Also, the 
banking system and the dollar quotation were deregulated, and the price of the dollar 
was determined by an exchange rate band (banda cambiaria) rather than the previous 
crawling peg system. In addition, the Central Bank lost its authority to promote 
certain economic sectors, and its role was limited to coordinating the monetary, 
exchange and credit policies independent of the government. Finally, the pension and 
health care systems were reformed and semi-privatized; seaports and energy 
distribution were privatized; and telecommunication and TV broadcasting were 
permitted to accept private capital. 
Besides these transformations, Colombian society changed the structure of the 
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State by drafting a new Constitution in 1991. Among other changes, the judicial 
system was expanded to include a Prosecutor’s Office (Fiscalia), a Constitutional 
Court, an Administrative Court (Consejo Superior de la Judicatura) and the Tutela, 
which is a judicial tool to protect the fundamental rights of citizens. The new 
Constitution also designed the Colombian decentralization system and ordered the 
Government to transfer 55% of its current revenues to local administrations. All of 
these changes increased the size of the State and the public sector’s need for more 
resources. 
In the early 1990’s, the Cusiana and Cupiagua oil fields were discovered. They 
allowed oil exports to increase from US$1.5 billion in 1994 to US$2.9 billion in 1996. 
In addition, there was a boom in drug trafficking, which became 8% of Colombian 
GDP.6 
According to Echeverry (2001), the Apertura, the discovery of oil fields and the 
drug trafficking boom allowed a massive influx of foreign capital that increased the 
debt possibilities of all economic agents. The Apertura reduced some restrictions to 
imports and to foreign currency movements, whereas the new oil explorations and 
drug traffic augmented the liquidity of the Colombian financial system. Also, some 
international banks reduced their restrictions on lending to Colombian firms and the 
government. Consequently, many economic agents took out amounts of debt far 
above any realistic possibilities of repayment in order to finance consumption and 
investment. In addition, the financial system did not take cautions to evaluate risk and 
protect their credits. The government also increased consumption from 13% GDP in 
1991 to 19% GDP in 1998, particularly to finance the institutions created by the new 
Constitution and the new decentralization system, and to support the public pension 
system. The economic growth rate reached 4% on average between 1991 and 1997, 
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almost entirely due to the increasing possibilities to acquire debt.7 
 Between 1997 and 1999, the Southeast Asia countries, Brazil and Russia fell into 
serious financial difficulties and economic crisis. As a result, access to international 
credit for the emerging markets was reduced and the amount of foreign capital 
coming into Colombia diminished. The government and the private firms had to 
adjust their own budget constraints, shrinking their levels of consumption and 
investment. In addition, the Colombian business cycle was winding down in 1997, 
generating a deep decline in aggregate demand. The Central Bank interpreted these 
signals as demand weakness and adopted an expansive monetary policy, but a 
significant amount of foreign capital went abroad, thereby increasing the depreciatory 
pressures on the currency. 
To avoid a massive loss of international reserves, a weakening currency and 
inflation, the Central Bank increased the interest rate for its transactions with 
commercial banks. Moreover, the Government’s needs to finance its expenses also 
generated pressures over the market interest rates and the exchange rate. As shown in 
Figure 1, the interest rate for 90-day deposits skyrocketed from 22.8% in 1997 to 
36.5% in 1998, and only returned to its initial level in April 1999. 
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Figure 1: Interest Rate on 90-Day Deposits, 1996-2004 
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    Source: Banco de la Republica (Central Bank of Colombia). 
 
The combination of high interest rates, weak demand and delayed payment from 
clients affected the economic situation of many firms. Some of them saw diminishing 
revenues on the one hand and, on the other, an increase in the percentage of their 
budgets dedicated to interest payments. Moreover, as Echeverry and Salazar (1999) 
reported, the increasing market uncertainty and the weak profile of clients produced a 
reduction in the credit supply, called a credit crunch.8 Consequently, many firms 
could not take out new loans in 1998 and 1999.  
According to the Colombian Government (Superintendencias de Sociedades y 
Superintendencia de Valores), in 1998 and 1999, 626 firms entered into restructuring 
or liquidation processes (323 firms to concordato and 303 companies to quiebra). 
These companies had liabilities of COL$13.2 trillion pesos (US$7.5 billion dollars); 
52% of which was owed to commercial banks and financial institutions. In 1999, 
these firms spent COL$850 billion pesos (US$483 million dollars) paying interest 
costs. Their losses were approximately COL$930 billion pesos (US$528 million 
dollars). These results worried the government because these firms employed 350,000 
people and their sales represented 20% of Colombian GDP. Of course, these results 
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were reflected in GDP growth and the unemployment rate, as shown in Figures 2 and 
3. 
Figure 2: Quarterly GDP Growth Rate, 1995-2003 
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     Growth rate measured as quarterly GDP of current quarter compared with the same quarter in  
the previous year. Source: DANE (Colombian Statistic Agency). 
 
Figure 3: Unemployment Rate, 1994-2003 
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      Source: DANE 
 
In 1999, Colombia faced its worst economic crisis in 70 years. As shown in Figure 
2, quarterly GDP plummeted –6.9% in the third quarter of 1999, and the annual GDP 
growth rate was –4.3% that year. By contrast, the unemployment rate skyrocketed 
from 12% in 1997 to 20% in 1999. The external sector also affected the economy: in 
that period, coffee reached historically-low prices, and Colombia’s second and third-
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largest trade partners, Venezuela and Ecuador, were also suffering serious economic 
problems. To offset these negative results, the Central Bank established a floating 
exchange rate, and the government commenced a fiscal adjustment program under an 
agreement with the IMF. Under the agreement, ambitious State reform was introduced, 
the decentralization process was reformed and Law 550 was enacted. This program 
helped reduce pressures on the interest rate and increased confidence in the viability 
of the Colombian economy.  
In addition, many firms understood the weakness of domestic demand and started 
up new businesses with the USA and Europe. Using the Andean Trade Preferences 
Act (ATPA) with the USA and the Generalized Preference Act (GPA) with the 
European Union, some industries, like clothing, flowers, and vegetable oil, increased 
their exports with the help of technical support provided by the government. Although 
exports have been rising between 2000 and 2004, at the moment they are still not an 
“engine” to lead the economic growth of Colombia. 
Until 1999, the Colombian bankruptcy procedure was composed of two parts: the 
concordato and the quiebra. The first was a financial reorganization procedure 
designed to reach a conciliatory agreement between a firm and its creditors, with the 
purpose of rehabilitating and conserving the company as an economic unit and 
protecting its credit. This mechanism was in the hands of a specialized government 
agency named Superintendence of Companies (Superintendencia de Sociedades) that 
was in charge of resolving disputes and confirming any agreement between parties. 
However, the concordato was criticized because of its tendency toward liquidation 
solutions, its excessive length of time, the high administrative costs and the formality 
of the bargaining process. The second, the quiebra, was a liquidation procedure, in 
which the assets of the company were sold and their proceeds distributed to creditors. 
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It was also criticized because it was delayed and penalized the liquidated firm’s 
owners and managers. Moreover, these two procedures were criticized for giving too 
much weight to creditors and for being too slow to face the massive amount of 
bankruptcies in 1999. Law 550 changed the purpose of the Colombian bankruptcy 
mechanism, among other things. These elements are explained in the next section. 
 
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COLOMBIAN BANKRUPTCY 
PROCEDURE 
 
According to the Colombian Constitution, firms and companies are the source of 
economic development. Although the Constitution guarantees them free enterprise 
and private property, it also imposes the social responsibility of creating productive 
employment. Under this constitutional mandate, the government has permission to 
intervene in the economy through market regulations that promote employment. 
 Following this line of argument, Law 550’s main purpose is to facilitate the 
bargaining processes among shareholders, creditors, etc. that allow for the 
preservation of economically-viable companies that generate working positions. 
According to the government’s exposition to Parliament, the intention of this law is to 
provide debtors and creditors with adequate incentives and mechanisms to reach 
agreements among parties, and design and carry out programs that allow firms and 
companies to normalize their activities, honor their financial commitments and 
maintain the employment already generated. 
Law 550 is essentially an act regulating the bargaining process among 
stakeholders, to be supervised by the government through specialized agencies 
(superintendencias) in each economic sector, but under the overall control of the 
  21
Superintendence of Companies. This act does not establish a specific result or 
distribution of the firm’s economic value as determined by a third party (the 
government), but it encourages debtors and creditors to reach agreements that benefit 
them and society under a definite regulation. These agreements are contractual deals 
outside the judicial sphere, but carry all the penalties that civil justice considers for 
these kinds of contracts.  
The law states that the Superintendence of Companies must collect all available 
information to evaluate the firm’s economic viability and offer it to the parties to 
make a decision about the firm’s fate. Specifically, a person called promotor, 
appointed by the Superintendence, is the mediator among stakeholders and is in 
charge of collecting information about the firm’s operation, performing business 
forecasting (revenues, costs, profits, etc), and suggesting what should be done with 
the bankrupted company; however, only the interested parties can make the final 
decision. The law does not explicitly stipulate the ex-post efficiency condition as the 
main criterion for decision-making, and due to the fact that it is also interested in 
maintaining already-generated employment, there might be cases in which firms that 
should have been liquidated are still working.  
Law 550 is oriented to give more importance to restructuring processes than 
liquidation processes. This orientation to restructuring is observed in the priority 
preservation of claims. The act suggests an order of priority in which employees, 
retired workers, tax debts and social contributions should be paid first in the 
distribution process. Afterward, secured creditors, unsecured creditors and 
shareholders have equal priority. The law considers that this treatment of creditors 
allows for more flexible bargaining and encourages creditors to value the economic 
viability of the bankrupted firm more than their own interests. In other words, there is 
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not an absolute-priority-of-claims rule in which creditors’ interests are first honored.  
To approve any restructuring plan, the promotor has to determine the voting right 
for each stakeholder based on their proportion of the value of liability and value of 
equity (i.e., in the case of creditors, the number of votes is determined by the value of 
the principal of their loans without interest payments; in the case of shareholders, 
their votes are equivalent to the initial value of their shares; in the case of workers, 
their votes will depend on the amount of unpaid wages, and so on). To facilitate an 
agreement, this act reduced the minimum percentage necessary to approve a 
restructuring plan from 75% to 50% plus one vote, but it also established the 
condition that at least three kinds of stakeholders must accept the plan. If no proposed 
plan is approved, the firm enters into a liquidation process. 
Law 550 is concerned that delayed processes can reduce the economic value of a 
firm. Therefore, in theory, it establishes certain negotiating periods that allow a 
restructuring agreement to be reached in around 8 months. First, the process starts 
with a request of restructuring negotiation by the debtor, one or various creditors 
(whose loans must be at least 5% of the firm’s liabilities) or the government. The 
superintendencias have 3 days to decide whether to accept the request or not. Second, 
if request is accepted, the respective superintendencia in charge of the process has 5 
days to appoint the promotor and to summon creditors and stakeholders interested in 
the process. The secured creditors have 10 days to declare whether they are interested 
in redeeming the collateral of their loans, but they can only redeem the collateral after 
two years if a restructuring deal is achieved. Third, there is a period of 4 months in 
which the promotor is in charge of collecting all relevant information about the firm’s 
operations, computing business forecasts (revenues, costs, profits, etc), designing 
possible restructuring plans to present to the parties and determining the admissible 
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number of votes for each stakeholder. After that period, there is a meeting in which 
the promotor communicates the distribution of voting power and the total amount of 
the firm’s debt. Finally, after that meeting, there is up to 4 months to achieve a 
restructuring agreement among parties and the fulfillment of the deal is mandatory for 
all stakeholders, regardless whether they participate or not in the bargaining process. 
In case a deal is not reached, the firm enters into a liquidation process, which is a 
stage where the firm’s assets are auctioned off and the money is distributed among 
stakeholders. The law does not stipulate that a portion be reserved for shareholders, 
and the process of liquidation can last up to two years. 
However, in practice, the processes can be time-consuming because the law states 
that any stakeholder can protest the results of each stage (i.e. protest the promotor’s 
election, the distribution of voting power, etc), and the law does not include periods to 
resolve these protests. Furthermore, the law gives the following stakeholders the 
power to veto the restructuring agreement: a) to current and retired workers if the 
agreement does not respect their acquired rights; b) to the firm’s owners if the deal 
changes the property rights of the firm’s assets; and c) to the government if the 
agreement affects the firm’s ability to pay taxes, social security contributions, etc. 
These powers generate a delayed bargaining process, resulting in the dissipation of 
firm value and the ability of some groups to extract favorable outcomes from 
stakeholders who do not hold veto rights. Although Law 550 professes to establish 
equality among stakeholders in the voting process, in practice the veto powers give 
more power to stakeholders interested in saving the firm. 
 Law 550 also has a debtor-oriented act. This law eliminated penal and civil 
sanctions on owners and managers that led the firm into bankruptcy, except if illegal 
activities are proved.9 In addition, the law allows the managers to maintain their posts 
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during the bargaining and/or liquidation process and gives the owners voting and veto 
power during the negotiation. However, the law recognizes the existence of “go for 
broke” and “all-or-nothing” incentives in the shareholders and managers. It 
establishes that a Code of Corporate Conduct (Codigo de conducta empresarial) must 
be approved among parties during the bargaining process. The code stipulates the 
accounting standards that managers promise to meet, the transparency and availability 
of all of the firm’s information for all parties, and the commitment that managers will 
not perform any operation that increases the firm’s risk or changes the ownership of 
the firm’s assets. If the code is not followed, the managers are sanctioned and the firm 
is liquidated. 
The Code of Corporate Conduct is a good policy to guarantee stakeholders’ rights 
during the bargaining process and the quality of information that everyone can obtain. 
In addition, this rule does not encourage risky behaviors by managers and allows for 
administration of the firm by the most experienced people. Nevertheless, the debtor-
orientation of the law affects the negotiation process by itself because owners and 
managers have significant bargaining power, can manipulate stakeholders in order to 
reach the majority needed to approve a restructuring plan,10 and can affect the 
creditors’ interests.  
The debtor-orientation of the law may also affect the credit supply for the firms. In 
Colombia, for example, firms and companies are characterized by a low level of 
shareholders’ capitalization and a high level of debt. When a firm goes bankrupt, 
creditors face more risk than shareholders. This affects the credit supply because 
creditors have to use more economic resources to screen activities during the lending 
stage and afterwards, the monitoring stage. Therefore, if Law 550 produces debtor-
oriented results, creditors may not be interested in lending money to firms, thereby 
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reducing the ex-ante efficiency.11 
Finally, Law 550 contemplates the possibility of debt-equity swaps. Creditors 
interested in swapping their loans for equities can receive shares, bonds or other 
securities that represent their rights on the firm’s assets. During and after the 
bargaining process, these securities can be sold to other stakeholders or to external 
investors. Even though this mechanism has been used in some restructuring processes, 
a significant problem arises in that creditors, especially financial institutions, do not 
have experience in managing companies. In addition, the Colombian stock market, 
which has few investors interested in buying the securities of restructured firms, is not 
adequately developed.  
According to LaPorta and Lopez-de-Silanes (2001),12 the Colombian Bankruptcy 
Law is part of the French civil code family. This family is considered the most debtor-
friendly and offers the least amount of protection to creditors. The main features of 
this code are: i) an automatic stay on assets; ii) no assurance that secured creditors get 
paid first; iii) no restrictions on managers seeking court protection from creditors; and 
iv) no removal of managers during reorganization proceedings. 
 
 
C.   DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS OF LAW 550 
  
Between 2000 and mid-2004, 932 companies entered into either restructuring or 
liquidation processes: 678 firms used the restructuring mechanism (72.7% of the 
total) and 254 companies went into liquidation (27.3% of the total). In this period, 565 
firms, or 83.3% of all firms in the restructuring process, reached a restructuring 
agreement, and 113 remain in the negotiating process. Figure 4 shows the number of 
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companies in each type of mechanism for each given year. 
Figure 4: Companies in Restructuring or Liquidation Processes, 2000-2004 
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    Source: Superintendence of Companies.  
 
In addition, these firms represent an important part of the Colombian economy. 
The firms in the restructuring process have COL$9.2 trillion pesos in assets (US$3.9 
billion dollars); COL$6.3 trillion pesos in liabilities (US$2.7 billion dollars); 
COL$2.8 trillion pesos in equity (US$1.3 billion dollars) and employ 57,377 people. 
The firms in the liquidation process have COL$1.1 trillion pesos in assets (US$480 
million dollars), COL$937 billion pesos in liabilities (US$423 million dollars) and 
employ 13,156 people13. 
Among users of the restructuring mechanism, large firms represented the greatest 
number (35.1%), followed by small and medium companies (28.3% and 26.5%, 
respectively). In contrast, small firms were more often found in the liquidation 
process (37.9%), followed by medium (28.6%) and large firms (19.3%). As shown in 
Figure 5, only 3.3% of restructuring cases are micro firms, whereas they represent 
5.6% of companies in the liquidation process. It is clear that the larger a firm, the 
  27
greater the chance it will be restructured. This phenomenon could be explained 
because large companies have more options for obtaining credit (domestic financial 
institutions, the stock market, international financial markets, etc) while small firms 
can only borrow resources from domestic banks and financial institutions. 
Consequently, when these firms enter the restructuring process, large firms have more 
opportunities to achieve favorable restructuring plans than small ones. In addition, 
large firms generally have more shareholders than small companies and therefore 
more parties interested in reaching a restructuring deal.14   
Figure 5: Firms in Restructuring and Liquidation Process by Size, 2000-2004 
In Restructuring Process               In Liquidation Process 
Small, 28.3%
Medium, 26.5%
Micro, 3.3%No Available, 
6.8%
Large, 35.1%
Medium, 28.6%
No Available, 
8.7%
Large, 19.3%
Micro, 5.6%
Small, 37.9%
Source: Superintendence of Companies. 
If one observes the economic sectors to which the firms belong, we see that 
manufacturing and commerce are the sectors that most often filed for restructuring 
and liquidation, with 34.1% and 18.1%, respectively, for the former, and 32.3% and 
24.2%, respectively, for the latter. After them, other services and construction are the 
sectors that most often apply for these procedures. It is apparent, then, that the firms 
most affected by the Colombian recession and most likely to need the bankruptcy 
mechanism come from the labor-intensive sectors. This result might suggest that the 
purpose of helping firms that generate employment was the main objective in 
applying these mechanisms. However, this hypothesis will be tested in future research. 
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Figure 6: Firms in Restructuring and Liquidation Processes by Economic 
Sector, 2000-2004 
    In Restructuring Process                In Liquidation Process 
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Blanks/N.A.: Information not available. Source: Superintendence of Companies. Information available up to June 2004. 
 
How well has Law 550 performed? To answer this question, it is necessary to 
analyze some indicators like length of the bargaining process, and some financial 
indicators. 
Figure 7 shows the length of the bargaining process for cases in which 
restructuring plans were achieved. It can be observed that 42.2% of firms that reached 
restructuring agreements did so in a period between 6-8 months, as Law 550 intends, 
and 36% between 8-10 months. Furthermore, 6.6% of companies were able to finish 
the bargaining process successfully in less than 6 months. However, in 15% of cases, 
a restructuring plan was approved only after 10 months and, in some cases, approval 
took up to 24 months. This result means that the law has been relatively successful in 
achieving restructuring agreements within the intended time frame, but it is still 
necessary for the law to reduce and limit the periods for responding to protests and 
vetoes. This would increase the speed of the bargaining process and, therefore, would 
increase ex-post efficiency. 
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Figure 7: Length of Bargaining Process of Companies that Reached 
Agreements, in months 
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 Source: Superintendence of Companies. Calculations by the author.. 
 
Liquidation processes consume more time. As seen in Figure 8, 21% of the 
finished processes of liquidation lasted between 8-10 months, and there is a uniform 
distribution around 5% after 12 months. In other words, 60% of the liquidation cases 
ended after 1 year, with some lasting up to 30 months or more. Only 19% of cases are 
finished before 8 months, making the liquidation process very expensive in economic 
terms. 
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Figure 8: Length of Liquidation Process, in months 
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  Source: Superintendence of Companies.  
 
How have the companies in restructuring processes performed in financial terms? 
To analyze this performance, I calculated some financial indicators which shed some 
light on the reasons for their financial distress and their performance since Law 550 
was enacted. 
Using a data base from the Superintendence of Companies, I collected available 
information on assets, liabilities, equity, income, expenses and earnings from 261 
firms between 1993 and 2003: 152 large-size companies in the restructuring process, 
26 large-size companies in the liquidation process, 63 medium-size firms in a 
restructuring agreement and 20 medium-size firms in the liquidation process.15 Then, 
I calculated some financial indicators of liquidity (asset-liabilities ratio and acid test), 
debt (short-term liability concentration, debt level and debt-equity ratio) and 
profitability (asset turnover, equity profitability, gross margin and operating margin). 
Finally, I compared these financial indicators with those of all companies in the data 
base.16 
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As seen in Figure 9, those firms accepted into protection under Law 550 
accumulated large levels of debt significantly above their financial capabilities since 
1996-1997. If we observe the debt level indicator (total liabilities over total assets), 
we can see that, on average, the distressed firms showed higher levels of debt since 
1993, but not much different from healthy companies. Nevertheless, between 1996 
and 1997, distressed large and medium-sized companies started to show consistently 
higher amounts of debt until they reached levels five times higher than those of non-
distressed companies. The debt-equity ratio confirms this result (Figure 10). 
Figure 9: Debt Level, 1993-2003 
(Total liabilities/Total assets) 
25
75
125
175
225
275
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
%
Large Restructuring Large Liquidation
Medium Restructuring Medium Liquidation
All Companies
 
 Source: Superintendence of Companies. Calculations by the author. 
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Figure 10: Debt-Equity Ratio, 1993-2003 
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In addition, these ailing firms had reductions in their profitability indicators. As 
shown in Figure 11, the firms under Law 550 had asset turnover indicators similar to 
healthy firms until 1997. However, since 1998, firms with financial troubles 
systematically showed less benefit with respect to assets than companies without 
problems.  
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Figure 11: Asset Turnover, 1993-2003 
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 Source: Superintendence of Companies. Calculations by the author. 
The reduction of profitability in ailing firms can also be observed using operating 
margin indicators (Figure 12). Both ailing firms and healthy companies showed 
similar operating margins, on average, until 1997. However, since 1998, ailing firms 
(in restructuring or in liquidation processes) had negative operating margins whereas 
healthy companies had positive ones.  
Figure 12: Operating Margin, 1993-2003 
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 Source: Superintendence of Companies. Calculations by the author. 
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From the results of the financial indicators, I conclude that ailing firms that applied 
Law 550 demonstrated financial troubles since 1997 and that these problems were not 
generated by the 1999 recession. In other words, the rise of debt level and reduction 
of profitability indicators started two years before the recession; therefore, some of 
the ailing firms could have had structural problems that the decline in GDP growth in 
1999 exacerbated. Law 550 has as a main objective facilitating the negotiation of the 
restructuring process for firms with financial troubles caused by the recession, but it is 
possible that some companies with long-term problems have also been accepted into 
the restructuring process instead of going straight to the liquidation process. 
Have ailing firms’ financial performances improved with Law 550? According to 
Quiñonez (2003),17 ailing firms have not demonstrated better financial indicators 
under Law 550 than under the previous concordato bankruptcy system. She 
conducted a survey with 89 medium and small-size firms, 36 with restructuring 
agreements under Law 550 and 53 in concordato to test the hypothesis that the 
companies in the Law 550 restructuring process show better financial ratios than 
those in concordato. With the collected information, she figured out some financial 
indicators like debt-to-equity ratio, pre-tax profit margin, profit margin, operational 
cycle, net working capital, asset turnover, change-of-net-income-to-change-of-equity-
ratio, and change-of-net-income-to-change-of-asset ratio. 
She did not find any statistical evidence that confirmed the existence of different 
ratios between these two types of companies, but she found some interesting results. 
For instance, in the operational cycle, she found that firms in concordato have shorter 
cycles than companies in the restructuring process and, therefore, more liquidity. In 
addition, firms in concordato showed recuperation in their net working capital 
whereas companies in the restructuring process experienced reductions. In asset 
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turnover, both types of firms reported bad results, but those companies in the 
restructuring process were worse. In debt-to-equity ratio, the firms in the restructuring 
process had higher levels of debt than the companies in concordato, but the former 
showed faster reductions in this indicator. 
Also, Quiñonez (2003) found that both kinds of firms have negative profit margins, 
but firms in concordato are more affected. This negative result means that all firms 
have operational and management problems that prevent them from transforming 
sales into benefits. Finally, the indicators change-of-net-income-to-change-of-equity-
ratio and change-of-net-income-to-change-of-asset ratio showed in both kinds of 
firms that the shareholders have not made the effort to inject capital and improve the 
operation of the firms. Consequently, these companies have operational problems and 
cannot transform their assets into operational profits. This panorama has worsened 
because of their high levels of debt. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF THE LAW 550  
 
For an empirical evaluation of the bargaining process under Law 550, I collected 
information from some restructuring and liquidation processes that took place 
between 2000 and 2003. Until December of 2003, the Superintendence of Companies 
had a set of 252 processes in which companies reached restructuring agreements and 
another 52 cases of firms in mandatory liquidation. From this set, I picked a sample of 
50 companies with restructuring agreements and 10 firms in mandatory liquidation, 
and gathered the following information on the bargaining process for this sample: i) 
the stakeholders’ voting rights; ii) the voting process; iii) the restructuring formula 
with different stakeholders; iv) the elements of corporate governance included in the 
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Code of Corporate Conduct (Codigo de Conducta Empresarial); and v) the reasons 
that firms in liquidation filed for this process. 
In Appendix 1, I listed the companies that belong to the sample in both 
restructuring and liquidation cases. In addition, I listed company information about  
assets, liabilities, equity, starting date of restructuring/liquidation process, date in 
which the agreement was reached, size and economic sector to which they belong. 
 
A. COMPANIES IN RESTRUCTURING PROCESS 
i) The stakeholders’ voting rights and voting participation 
Law 550 establishes a process to determine the voting rights for each stakeholder 
participating in the restructuring negotiation. Article 22 says that the promotor 
computes the voting rights for stakeholders (different from shareholders) based on the 
amount of capital owed them by the ailing firm. He can only consider the debt’s 
principal, and not interest payments, sanction fees, etc., in his calculations. To 
determine the voting rights of shareholders, the promotor considers the shareholder’s 
share in equity after deducting dividends, equity revalorization, financial surplus, etc. 
If the equity is negative, the promotor gives each shareholder a voting right equivalent 
to one Colombian Peso (US$0.00037 dollars in 2004). The law allows only the 
inclusion of interest payments, sanction fees, etc. into the voting rights calculation if 
the firm had a debt with the government agency in charge of collecting national taxes 
and tariffs, the Direccion de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales DIAN.   
Based on the sample of 50 firms in the restructuring process, I calculated the 
voting rights for each stakeholder group. I found that, on average, shareholders have 
17.4% of the voting rights, current and retired workers have 4.1%, the government 
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and social security institutions have 13.2%, secured creditors have 42.7% and 
unsecured creditors have 22.6%. Figure 13 shows a histogram of frequencies for the 
voting rights of each group of stakeholders. 
Figure 13: Distribution of Voting Rights among Stakeholder Groups 
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* In 33.3% of cases, shareholders have voting rights close to 0%. 
** In 58.8% of cases, current and retired workers have voting rights of less than 5%. 
Source: Superintendence of Companies. Calculations by the author. 
 
As observed in Figure 13, there is a high concentration of cases in which 
shareholders, workers and government groups have low percentages of voting rights 
(positively skewed distribution). the percentage of cases where voting rights were 
between 0% and 10% was 45.1% for shareholders, 76.5% for workers, and 58.8% for 
the government. 
On the other hand, the secured creditors group shows a distribution with voting 
rights percentage peaks between 30% and 40% and between 60% and 80%. In 
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addition, the unsecured creditors group is concentrated in low voting rights 
percentages, although they are not as concentrated as shareholders, workers and the 
government. 
Even though the shareholders, workers and government groups show the lowest 
percentages of voting rights, Law 550 gives them veto power in the bargaining 
process. In Article 30, the law gives veto power to workers if any part of the 
restructuring agreement affects their benefits, to shareholders if the agreement 
includes any change of property on the firm’s assets and to the government if the 
agreement includes a sale of assets that affects the firm’s capacity to pay fiscal, social 
security and labor debts. Consequently, the law could be generating debtor-friendly 
agreements because it gives significant bargaining power to minority groups 
associated with the objective of keeping the firm working, whereas creditor groups 
with large amounts of loans and, therefore, larger risk, have relatively weak 
bargaining power with respect to their voting rights. 
What is the percentage of stakeholder participation in the restructuring process? 
To answer this question, I added the voting rights percentages of those stakeholders 
who effectively participated in the restructuring agreement. Based on the information 
collected from 50 restructuring agreements, I found that, on average, 79.2% of 
stakeholders with voting rights participated in the bargaining process: in 10% of cases, 
this participation was between 50% and 60%, 22% were between 60% and 70%, 20% 
were between 70% and 80%, 20% were between 80% and 90% and 28% of cases 
were between 90% and 100%. 
Law 550 establishes that any restructuring agreement must be approved by a 
minimum of three stakeholder groups with 50% plus one of the voting rights. Figure 
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14 shows that in 52% of the cases, all stakeholders who participated in the bargaining 
process gave a positive vote to approve the restructuring agreement. In other words, 
there was unanimity in the voting process in 26 of 50 cases.  
Figure 14: Voting Participation vs. Positive Voting in Restructuring 
Agreements 
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 Source: Superintendence of Companies. Calculations by the author.. 
 
Figure 14 also shows that Law 550 has made the requirements to approve a 
restructuring agreement more flexible. The previous bankruptcy system (Law 222 of 
1995) required that any restructuring agreement be approved by at least 75% of all 
stakeholders with recognized voting rights. Law 550 reduced this requirement to 50% 
plus one of the voting rights. As shown, 56% of cases (28 out 50) were approved by 
less than 75%: 16% had between 50% and 60% approval; 32% between 60% and 
70%; and 8% between 70% and 75%. Law 550, then, saved more than one half of the 
cases being studied from liquidation.  
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ii) The voting process 
On average, any restructuring agreement is reached with an approval rate 
equivalent to 71.9% of the total voting rights: 14.9% from shareholders; 3% from 
current and retired workers; 8.2% from government and social security institutions; 
31% from secured creditors; and 14.8% from unsecured creditors. Negative votes and 
abstention corresponded to 4.1% and 24% of total voting rights, respectively.  
Which group was most likely to support a restructuring agreement? To make the 
results comparable, I calculate the following ratio for each stakeholder group: sum of 
voting rights of stakeholders who voted positive (negative or abstention) over total 
voting rights. Figure 15 shows these calculations. 
Figure 15: Results of Voting Process for each Stakeholder Group 
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Source: Superintendence of Companies. Calculations by the author.. 
 
The shareholders group has the largest proportion of positive votes approving 
restructuring agreements: 85.5% of shareholders voted positive, 0% voted negative 
and 14.5% did not participate in the voting process. Government and social security 
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institutions are the group with the smallest proportion of positive votes and the largest 
proportion of negative votes: 61.7% voted positive, 8.5% voted negative and 29.7% 
did not participate. Finally, unsecured creditors abstained most often: 66.8% voted 
positively, 0.6% voted negatively and 32.7% did not participate. 
We can see that some participation results agree with the theory. For example, the 
shareholders group has the largest positive voting proportion because they have the 
most interest in keeping the company working. This is because they can maximize 
their benefits and the firm’s value by preventing the company’s liquidation.18 In 
addition, this group does not have any negative votes and the smallest proportion of 
abstentions. 
 Another group interested in keeping the firm working is the current and retired 
workers because the salaries and pensions they receive from the firm are usually their 
only source of income. 73.5% voted positive, and only 0.3% voted negative with a 
large abstention rate of 26.2%.  
 The government and social security institutions group is indifferent to the firm’s 
fate. According to the theory, they are only interested in collecting the capital owed 
them by the firm. Consequently, their rationality during the bargaining process is to 
approve agreements that provide the best payment conditions, whether or not the firm 
is viable. Therefore, it is not illogical that this group has the smallest percentage of 
positive voting (61.7%) and the largest percentage of negative voting (8.5%). 
Finally, the secured and unsecured creditors groups show large percentages of 
positive voting (72.8% and 66.8%, respectively). The theory explains that secured 
creditors have less interest in holding up a restructuring agreement because they have 
incentives of getting their money back and, probably, cutting any link with the ailing 
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firm after restructuring. They would not approve those agreements in which the 
restructuring formula gives them less return than agreed to in the defaulted loan 
contract or less money than the loan’s principal. Therefore, we can expect low 
positive voting percentages from this group. Nevertheless, we see that the secured 
creditors group, with the third largest percentage of positive votes among stakeholder 
groups (72.8%) and a small proportion of negative votes (6.6%), plays an important 
role in approving an agreement. This result is very important because it demonstrates 
that the secured creditors have a particular interest in helping to rescue the firms from 
bankruptcy, which was the intent of Law 550. In other words, secured creditors have 
shown a sense of collaboration in approving restructuring agreements, probably in 
contradiction to their own incentives. 
The theory also explains that unsecured creditors have an interest in receiving their 
money, but that some would maintain their relationship with the ailing firm if their 
businesses are related. If the unsecured creditor’s business cycle is similar to the 
firm’s, the former is interested in maintaining a business relationship with the latter 
(i.e., input suppliers). Otherwise, the relationship would be broken.  
We see that this group has the second smallest proportion of positive votes (66.8%) 
and the largest proportion of abstentions among all stakeholder groups (32.7%). The 
large percentage of positive votes is probably due to the large number of input 
suppliers in this group. Consequently, they would be interested in approving 
restructuring agreements. 
If we analyze which groups usually participate in the coalitions that approve the 
restructuring agreements, we see they usually consist of shareholders, secured 
creditors and unsecured creditors (Appendix 2). From 39 cases in which all 
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stakeholder groups had voting rights, shareholders appeared in 29 cases, secured 
creditors in 31, and unsecured creditors in 34. Workers and the government appeared 
in only 28 and 23 cases, respectively. From eight cases in which only four stakeholder 
groups participated, the shareholders appeared in four cases, and both secured and 
unsecured creditors appeared in seven. Workers and government groups appeared in 
only two and three cases, respectively. Finally, in one case in which only three groups 
have voting rights, shareholders, the government and unsecured creditors are the 
coalition. In one case in which only two groups had voting rights, shareholders and 
secured creditors participated in the coalition.  
This result leads to an important conclusion: in order to approve any restructuring 
agreement, it is necessary for the groups with the largest amount of voting rights (i.e. 
shareholders, secured creditors and unsecured creditors) to agree with the 
restructuring process. It is also necessary that minority groups with veto powers (i.e. 
workers and the government) agree with the restructuring process because they could 
halt the agreement even if they do not participate in the voting process. 
iii) The restructuring formula with different stakeholders 
a. Priority order 
In general, restructuring agreements do not explicitly consider a priority order of 
payments. However, in nine cases, there is a priority structure among stakeholders: in 
six of those cases, the priority order was i) current and retired workers; ii) government 
and social security institutions; iii) secured creditors; iv) unsecured creditors; and v) 
shareholders. In two cases, the priority order of payments depended on the amount of 
new money the stakeholders were able to offer in the restructuring process: i)workers 
and the government; ii)unsecured creditors; iii) secured creditors with new money; iv) 
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creditors willing to accept debt-equity swaps; v) creditors who do not accept debt-
equity swaps; and vi) shareholders. Finally, in one case the priority was: i) 
government; ii) unsecured creditors; and iii) shareholders.  
As explained above, the Colombian bankruptcy law is part of the French civil code 
family. Among other things, this family does not assure that secured creditors receive 
first payment, and offers less protection for creditors. The order of priority shown 
above is an example of this feature. 
b. Debt Rescheduling 
I found that the usual restructuring formula is the postponement of debt payments. 
In all cases, the stakeholders were willing to reschedule their credits, and in some 
cases, by up to 20 years. However, this is not the only formula: the rescheduling of 
credits was accompanied with the sale of the firm’s assets, new credits, new capital, 
debt-equity swaps, bonds and/or forgiving a portion of debts. Table 1 shows the 
number of cases of each restructuring formula. 
Table 1: Formulas of Debt Restructuring 
Debt Restructuring No. of Cases
Payments rescheduling 50
Sale of assets 21
New money (new credits) 3
New money (new capital) 2
Debt/Equity swap 7
Bonds 2
Forgiving debts 1  
       Source: Superintendence of Companies. Calculations by the author. 
 
Table 1 shows that, in 21 cases, the restructuring formula includes not only a 
payments rescheduling, but a sale of the firm’s assets. In other words, some 
agreements consider the firm paying its debts by giving its assets to creditors. In 
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addition, in only five cases the restructuring agreement included new money from 
credits or new capital. Finally, in seven cases, restructuring included debt/equity 
swaps; in two cases, it included bonds converted to equity; and, in one case, it 
included a portion of debts forgiven.  
Similar to the Korean case, the new Colombian bankruptcy system has not been 
efficient in attracting new resources to the ailing firms. Even though Law 550 has 
facilitated the procedures for reaching restructuring agreements among stakeholders, 
its incentive have not induced shareholders and creditors to offer new resources, 
probably because the perception of risk is high, even after the restructuring process. 
Colombian companies have historically used bank loans to finance their businesses 
instead of new shareholder capital or investment flows from the stock market. 
Consequently, when a firm experiences financial distress and secured creditors (i.e. 
banks and financial institutions) close their credits, break their commercial links with 
the company or are unwilling to offer new resources, the perception of risk is high 
among new investors even though financial indicators show improved performance.  
Any restructuring is a long-term process. In general, the firm’s debts are 
rescheduled for some years to help solve the firm’s financial troubles. Consequently, 
the benefits of the restructuring process (i.e. productivity improvements, healthy, 
sustainable financial indicators, etc.) can be seen at the end. In the sample, a 
restructuring agreement resulted in an average debt rescheduling of 9.5 years. In nine 
cases, the restructuring process was planned to take less than 5 years; in 27 cases, 
between 5 and 10 years; in five cases, between 10 and 15 years; and, in five cases, 
between 15 and 20 years. In four cases, the information was unavailable.  
The next part describes the results of bargaining with each stakeholders group in 
order to recognize the main features of the restructuring agreements and their benefits 
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or costs for each stakeholder. 
 
 b.1. Restructuring with current and retired workers 
There are 39 cases of restructuring agreements in which current and retired 
workers participated. On average, the restructuring agreements call for labor debts to 
be paid 13.6 months after the agreement has been signed. In five cases, labor and 
pension debts have to be paid immediately; in 14 cases, less than six months; in 10 
cases, between 6 and 12 months; in four cases, between 12 and 24 months; and in five 
cases, more than 24 months and no more than 84 months (Appendix 3). 
In 14 cases, the restructuring agreement has a dead period. On average, this period 
is 14.5 months. The period is less than 6 months in six cases; 12 months in three 
cases; 24 months in three cases; and more than 24 months in two cases.  
Because these restructured debts are paid in a short time, the agreement does not 
include any interest rate in 22 of the 39 cases. However, in seven cases, the agreement 
establishes an interest rate equal to the Consumer Price Index (CPI); in six cases, the 
interest rate was DTF19 plus some interest spread (between 0% and 9%); and, finally, 
in four cases, the interest rate was defined by the civil code.  
Current and retired workers are willing to accept restructuring formulas other than 
debt rescheduling in few cases. In 2 of 39 cases, they were willing to combine debt 
rescheduling with the possibility of a debt-equity swap, and, in one case, they 
accepted the firm’s assets or bonds. In addition, workers were willing to freeze their 
wages and/or extralegal privileges to help the firm restructure in only two cases.  
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b.2. Restructuring with Government and Social Security Institutions 
This group is divided into two subgroups: Government-fiscal institutions and 
social security institutions. In the first group, I include the national tax agency DIAN 
and local governments who collect local taxes. In the second group, there are 
institutions in charge of collecting pension and health contributions from firms and 
workers.  
In 44 cases, the firms in the restructuring process have to negotiate debt payments 
with fiscal institutions, especially with DIAN. As explained above, Law 550 considers 
that the amount of money under restructuring with each stakeholder to be the debt’s 
principal the firm owes him or her. However, in the case of fiscal institutions, the Law 
includes the sum of capital, interest, sanctions and fees owed by the firm. 
On average, the restructuring agreements establish that fiscal debts should be paid 
within 41.3 months after the agreement has been signed. In 10 cases, tax debts must 
be paid within 12 months; in nine cases, between 12 and 24 months; in six cases, 
between 24 and 36 months; in seven cases, between 36 and 60 months; and, in eight 
cases, more than 60 and no more than 120 months. 
In 23 cases, the restructuring agreement has a dead period. On average, this period 
is 21.3 months: this is less than 12 months in nine cases; between 12 and 24 months in 
11 cases; and more than 24 months in three cases.  
In respect to interest rates, I found that the restructuring agreements include annual 
CPI growth as an interest rate in six cases; the DTF interest rate in 11 cases; the DTF 
interest rate plus an interest spread (between 3% and 5%) in eight cases; and the DTF 
interest rate plus an interest spread that increases (between 0% and 30%) during the 
payment period in eight cases. In six cases, the interest rate is determined by the tax 
law or by other means. 
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With respect to restructuring formulas, all agreements use debt rescheduling as the 
main method of debt payment to government institutions, but in three out of 44 cases, 
the tax debts were paid with a combination of debt rescheduling and firm’s assets.  
Firms had to restructure their debts with social security institutions in 22 out of 50 
cases. On average, the restructuring agreements establish that debts with social 
security institutions should be paid within 37 months of approving the agreement: in 
four cases, within 12 months or less; in six cases, within 24 months; in three cases, 
within 48 months or less; in four cases, within 60 months; and, in two cases, within 84 
months. In 13 cases, the restructuring agreement had a dead period that lasted, on 
average, 19 months: in five cases, it was less than 12 months; in six cases, between 12 
and 24 months; and in two cases, 36 months.  
With respect to the interest rate paid by the firm to social security institutions, in 
four cases, the yearly CPI was used; in two cases, the DTF interest rate was used; in 
four cases, the interest rate was equal to DTF plus some interest spread (between 4% 
and 5%); and in three cases, there was a DTF interest rate with an interest spread that 
grew during the payment period (from 0% to 15%). In three cases, labor law 
determined the interest rate.  
Finally, similar to other stakeholders, there were few cases in which debt 
rescheduling was combined with other possible restructuring formulas. Social security 
institutions were willing to accept firm’s assets as payment for their credits in only 
one case. 
 
b.3. Restructuring with Secured Creditors 
The ailing firms had to negotiate their debts with secured creditors in 45 out of 50 
cases. On average, their debts must be paid within 115 months. In nine cases, debts 
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must be paid within 60 months or less; in nine cases, between 60 and 84 months; in 
four cases, between 84 and 108 months; in ten cases, between 108 and 132 months; in 
eight cases, between 132 and 180 months and, in five cases, between 180 and 240 
months. 
On average, the dead period agreed to with secured creditors is 51.6 months in a 
total of 35 cases: in 11 cases, the dead period was 24 months or less; in 12 cases, 
between 24 and 48 months; in five cases, between 48 and 72 months; in three cases, 
between 72 and 96 months; and in four cases, more than 96 months. 
The interest rate with secured creditors is often restructured. In 12 cases, the 
interest rate is reduced to annual CPI growth (in one case, 50% of annual CPI 
growth); in nine cases, the interest rate is adjusted to equal the DTF interest rate (in 
two cases, the interest rate was equal to 50% the DTF interest rate); in six cases, the 
interest rate is equal to DTF plus some interest spread (between 1% and 6%); and, in 
nine cases, the interest rate is the DTF interest rate with the interest spread increasing 
during the payment period (from 0% to 5%). There is one case with the interest rate 
equal to CPI rate plus an increasing interest spread (between 2% and 8%), and another 
case with interest rate equal to the DTF rate plus an increasing interest spread 
(between 0% and 15%), and two cases with other interest rate formulas. 
The agreements that I checked do not show the interest rate of secured creditors’ 
loans before restructuring. However, we can assume that these rates are similar to the 
market-lending rate. Figure 16 shows the market-lending rate, the DTF interest rate 
and the interest spread between them. As we can see, the average interest spread is 
7.9%. Therefore, in 38 out of 45 cases, secured creditors were willing to reduce the 
interest rate. 
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Figure 16: Market Lending Rate, DTF Interest Rate and Interest Spread 
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Source: Superintendence of Banks and Banco de la República. Calculations by the author. 
 
Restructuring agreements with secured creditors include restructuring formulas 
that are combined with debt rescheduling. In eight cases, secured creditors accepted 
the firm’s assets as payment; in three cases, the restructuring formula included debt-
equity swaps or the firm’s bonds, with better rescheduling conditions for those 
creditors who were willing to accept them; and in three cases, secured creditors were 
willing to offer new money through loans. The loans of secured creditors who do not 
participate in the restructuring process are typically rescheduled for the maximum 
period of time and with no interest rate. 
 
b.4. Restructuring with Unsecured Creditors 
In 42 cases, ailing firms had to negotiate their debts with unsecured creditors, 
particularly input suppliers. On average, these agreements have a limit of 83.5 months, 
the second largest period among stakeholders. In 14 cases, debts must be paid within 
60 months or less; in six cases, between 60 and 84 months; in three cases, between 84 
and 108 months; in eight cases, between 108 and 132 months; and in three cases, 
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between 132 and 240 months.  
In 28 cases, a dead period with an average of 48.4 months was established. In nine 
cases, the dead period was 24 months or less; in 11 cases, between 24 and 48 months; 
in three cases, between 48 and 72 months; in one case, between 72 and 96 months; 
and in four cases, more than 96 months. 
The interest rate was rescheduled in 27 cases. In four cases, it was reduced to zero 
percent; in 10 cases, it was rescheduled to match the annual CPI rate; in seven cases, 
the new interest rate was the DTF interest rate (in one case, the interest rate was 50% 
of the DTF rate and, in another case, was a combination of CPI increase and the DTF 
rate); in two cases, the interest rate was equal to the DTF rate plus an interest spread 
between 3% and 4.5%; and in four cases, the interest rate was the DTF rate plus an 
increasing spread between 3% and 15%. 
Restructuring agreements with unsecured creditors also include restructuring 
formulas combined with debt rescheduling. In seven cases, unsecured creditors 
accepted the firm’s assets as payment, and in six cases, the restructuring formula 
included debt-equity swaps or the firm’s bonds, with better rescheduling conditions 
for those creditors willing to accept them. In three cases, the restructuring agreement 
gives better payment conditions to creditors who were willing to give new money or 
keep their loans.  
 
b.5. Restructuring with Shareholders and the Code of Corporate Conduct (Codigo de 
Conducta Empresarial) 
The restructuring agreements explicitly establish the rescheduling of debt with 
shareholders in 16 cases. These agreements say that any debt to shareholders would 
be paid at the end of the restructuring process. In only two cases, the agreement 
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recognizes an interest rate equal to CPI annual growth rate. In five cases, shareholders 
have to swap their debts with equity or bonds, and, in two cases, with firm´s assets. 
Finally, in three cases, the agreement forbids any distribution of dividends during the 
restructuring process. 
According to Law 550, those firms applying for the restructuring process have to 
sign the Code of Corporate Conduct (Codigo de Conducta Empresarial), which is a 
list of management requirements that the company must fulfill during the 
restructuring process. In general, the code forces the firm to keep appropriate, 
transparent, complete and efficient accounting information for all stakeholders 
participating in the agreement. In addition, it reduces the scope of shareholders´ 
participation to strategic management and the design of good performance policies. 
The code forbids the firm’s management from giving or asking for loans, distributing 
dividends among shareholders, or buying the firm’s shares without permission from 
the stakeholders´ committee during the restructuring process. 
The Code of Corporate Conduct mandates other specific restructuring conditions 
that the ailing firm must fulfill. For example, in four cases, the code states how the 
ailing firm should be merged with other companies; in three cases, it regulates the 
conditions for paying off debts through the firm’s assets or debt prepayments; in two 
cases, the code obliges the firm to sell some non-productive assets and, in two cases, 
it gives conditions to change the firm’s management when stakeholders participate in 
the firm’s equity. Finally, in one case, it regulates how the firm can ask for new loans.  
Table 2 shows the conditions for restructuring payments negotiated with different 
stakeholders. We can see that restructuring agreements have an implicit priority order 
of payments: i) current and retired workers; ii) social security institutions; iii) 
government; iv) unsecured creditors; v) secured creditors; and vi) shareholders. 
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Therefore, these agreements do not satisfy the absolute-priority-order rule. In addition, 
these agreements frequently establish a reduction of the interest rate to the level of 
CPI or the DTF interest rate.  
 
Table 2: Conditions for Restructuring Payments with Stakeholders 
Workers and Retired People Government Institutions Social Security Institutions
Number of cases 38 44 22
Time-limit period (in months) 13.6 41.3 37
Dead period (in months) 14.5 21.3 19
Interest rate* 0% DTF interest rate CPI annual growth rate
DTF interest rate with spread
Secured Creditors Unsecured Creditors Shareholders
Number of cases 45 42 End of agreement
Time-limit period (in months) 115 83.5
Dead period (in months) 51.6 28
Interest rate* CPI annual growth rate CPI annual growth rate 0%
 
    * The most frequent interest rate agreed to with each stakeholder. 
    Source: Superintendence of Companies. Calculations by the author. 
 
 
B. COMPANIES IN LIQUIDATION PROCESS 
 
Law 550 says that those firms unable to garner the approval of 50% plus one of 
voters, or unable to fulfill the conditions of their restructuring payments must apply 
for a mandatory liquidation process. This process is regulated by the previous 
bankruptcy law (Law 220 of 1995).  
 
i) The stakeholders’ voting rights and voting participation 
I calculated the voting rights for each stakeholder group based on information from 
firms in mandatory liquidation. I found that, on average, shareholders have 1.3% of 
total voting rights, current and retired workers have 5.4%; government and social 
security institutions have 23.7%; secured creditors have 29.4%; and unsecured 
creditors have 40.1%.  
Similar to those firms in the restructuring process, there is a high concentration of 
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cases in which shareholders and workers have a small proportion of voting rights. For 
example, the maximum percentages of voting rights that shareholders and workers 
received in this sample were 8.4% and 15.7%, respectively.  
In this sample, government and social security institutions have a higher 
percentage of voting rights than in the restructuring process. Some companies have 
large tax debts with the national and local governments, making the government one 
of their most important creditors. The largest percentage of voting rights the 
government enjoyed in this sample was 48.8%. 
Similar to firms in the restructuring process, creditors have an important 
proportion of the voting rights of companies in mandatory liquidation. While creditors 
(both secured and unsecured) have 65.3% of voting rights in restructuring cases, they 
have 69.5% in mandatory liquidation cases. However, because firms in mandatory 
liquidation have more debts with unsecured creditors than secured creditors, the 
composition is different.    
 Information about voting results is unavailable for most of the mandatory 
liquidation cases. Consequently, I was unable to analyze the voting process of these 
companies. 
 
ii) The restructuring formula with different stakeholders 
a. Debt Rescheduling 
In the failed restructuring processes of firms undergoing mandatory liquidation, 
the usual formula was the rescheduling of debt payments. In most cases, the payment 
schedules were rearranged up to 8 years. In three cases, payment rescheduling was 
combined with the sale of the firm’s assets to stakeholders, and in one case, a portion 
of the debt was paid with services (T.V. advertisements) produced by the ailing firm. 
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a.1. Restructuring with current and retired workers 
In seven cases, these firms had debts with current and retired workers. On average, 
the debts have to be repaid within 24 months and a dead period of 10.5 months. With 
respect to interest rates, in four cases the interest rate is 0%; in one case, it is annual 
CPI plus 2%; and in one case, it is the DTF interest rate plus 5% during the first four 
years, and the DTF interest rate plus 6% until the end of payments. In one case, the 
interest rate is determined by previous agreements. In this sample, only the payments 
rescheduling is considered as the restructuring formula. 
 
a.2. Restructuring with Government and Social Security Institutions 
In nine cases, firms in mandatory liquidation had to negotiate their debts with 
government and fiscal institutions. On average, the time limit to pay their debts was 
32 months and the dead period was 15.2 months. In two cases, the interest rate that 
firms had to pay was the DTF interest rate; DTF plus 5% in one case; CPI annual 
growth rate plus a spread (between 0% and 2%) in three cases; and a rate regulated by 
the tax law in two cases. In one case, there was no information.  
The government and fiscal institutions accepted a different restructuring formula 
than payments rescheduling in only one case. This formula required the ailing firm to 
pay 50% of its debt in cash and 50% with services (T.V. advertisements) produced by 
the company. 
In five cases, ailing firms had debts with social security institutions. The average 
limit to pay these debts was 34.5 months, with a dead period of 14 months. In two 
cases, the interest rate was regulated by the civil law; in one case, it was the CPI 
annual growth rate; in one case, it was the DTF interest rate plus 5%; and in the final 
case, there was no information. The restructuring formulas were the same as those 
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used with government and fiscal institutions. 
 
a.3. Restructuring with Secured Creditors 
In eight cases, ailing firms negotiated their debts with secured creditors. On 
average, these loans were rescheduled to be paid in 72 months, with a dead period of 
44 months. In three cases, the interest rate was reduced to the CPI rate; the DTF 
interest rate in one case; and the DTF interest rate plus a spread (between 2% and 6%) 
in three cases. In one case, there was no information. 
Finally, in all cases, the restructuring formula was postponement of payments. 
However, in three cases, this formula was combined with sale of the firm’s assets and, 
in one case, with payment based on services.   
 
a.4. Restructuring with Unsecured Creditors 
In nine cases, firms in mandatory liquidation had to negotiate their debts with 
unsecured creditors. On average, these agreements had a limit of 64.5 months, with a 
dead period of 39 months. 
The negotiated interest rate was 0% in two cases; the CPI annual growth rate in 
two cases; the DTF interest rate in one case; and the DTF interest rate plus 2% in one 
case. In three cases, there was no information. 
Finally, in all cases, the restructuring formula was payments rescheduling. 
However, in three cases, this formula was combined with the sale of the firm’s assets 
and, in one case, with payment based on services.   
In summary, we can see that voting rights distribution and restructuring formulas 
during mandatory liquidation are similar to those in the restructuring process. 
Therefore, I conclude that agreements approved with firms in restructuring and firms 
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in liquidation are analogous in conditions and time limits.   
 
iii) Causes of mandatory liquidation 
On average, the bargaining process took 7.7 months to reach restructuring 
agreements. However, these ailing firms were working for 17.4 months before starting 
the mandatory liquidation process. 
From the liquidation processes files, I gathered information on the causes of the 
firms’ entrance into mandatory liquidation. The most usual cause was the firms’ 
inability to meet debt payments after the approved restructuring agreement. In 7 out 
of 10 cases, firms could not pay their post-agreement debts. In five cases, ailing firms 
could not fulfill their restructured tax payment scheme; in three cases, they could not 
pay debts to secured creditors, unsecured creditors and social security institutions; in 
two cases, they could not pay their debts to current and retired workers; in one case, 
the firm could not generate new money from new investors, and in one case, the ailing 
firm was not fulfilling its social purpose (i.e. it was producing nothing). 
In all cases, the firms’ managers tried to negotiate other restructuring agreements 
with stakeholders (especially new creditors), but these new agreements were not 
approved. Finally, in 7 out of 10 cases, ailing firms had negative equity when they 
started the liquidation process. 
 
C. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF EX-POST EFFICIENCY CONDITION 
 As explained above, the ex-post efficiency condition says that a firm should be 
reorganized if its value as a going concern is greater than its liquidation value. 
Otherwise, this firm should be shut down and liquidated piecemeal. If a bankruptcy 
law is able to guarantee this condition, then the welfare of the interested parties and 
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society would be improved.  
To evaluate whether or not Law 550 satisfies the ex-post efficiency condition, I 
obtained available financial information from two sources: first, the files of 31 firms 
in the restructuring process and five in the mandatory liquidation process; second, 
accounting information from the Superintendence of Companies’ data base. 
To compute a proxy of a firm’s going-concern value, I gathered information of 
predicted cash flows for each ailing firm during their restructuring period. I calculated 
the present value of these cash flows using a forecast of the DTF interest rate as a 
measure of capital opportunity cost. The source of this information is the records of 
each firm’s restructuring process. 
Then, I took the firm’s book value as a proxy of its piecemeal value. The source of 
this information is the Superintendence of Companies’ data base.   
I calculated the value of each firm’s cash flows for the year it entered the 
restructuring process, and I compared it with the firm’s book value of the same year. 
Because firms in mandatory liquidation were previously in a restructuring process, I 
calculated these values for the year in which they filed for the restructuring process 
(Appendix 4). 
I found that, in the firms in a restructuring process, the ex-post efficiency condition 
is satisfied in 23 out 31 cases, because the firm’s going-concern value is greater than 
its piecemeal value. However, in eight cases, the condition is not satisfied, and the 
companies should have been liquidated.  
In addition, in those firms in the mandatory liquidation process, the firm’s going-
concern value was greater than its piece-meal value in four out five cases. However, 
  59
in one case, the condition was not satisfied, and the firm should have been liquidated 
instead of entering into a restructuring process before being liquidated. 
In summary, in 25% of cases, the ex-post efficiency condition was not satisfied. 
Therefore, Law 550 allows some companies that should be liquidated to take part in a 
restructuring process. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Law 550 was conceived as a temporary mechanism to resolve bankruptcy cases 
in effect until the end of 2004, when the Colombian Parliament must choose whether 
to make it part of the permanent legislation, transform it or return to the previous 
system. Its main purpose was to give debtors and creditors adequate incentives and 
mechanisms to: i) reach agreements among parties, and ii) design and carry out 
programs that allow firms and companies to normalize their activities, honor their 
financial commitments and preserve already generated employment. 
So far, this law has helped 932 firms restructure their liabilities with their 
stakeholders or be liquidated. It has also helped to protect employment. 57,377 people 
did not lose their jobs from 678 firms in the restructuring process.  
Law 550 has improved the Colombian bankruptcy system by including rules for 
formal bargaining games, which has made the process more flexible. Under these 
rules, stakeholders can easily negotiate the restructuring of ailing firms’ debts. In 
addition, the number of votes required to approve agreements was reduced, thereby 
helping a large proportion of firms avoid liquidation.  
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This law also made the restructuring process less time-consuming than the 
previous system. In concordato, a restructuring process can easily be delayed two 
years. In the new system, around 78% of restructuring deals are achieved in 8 months 
or less. Nevertheless, around 15% cannot reach an agreement in the period established 
by law because it does not establish time-limits to respond to protests and the abuse of 
this instrument by some stakeholders, which reduces the firm’s economic value. In 
addition, most of the liquidation cases take more than 1 year to be resolved, and Law 
550 has been unable to expedite them, with a consequent cost in economic terms. 
The Code of Corporate Conduct (Codigo de conducta empresarial) has been one 
of the law’s most important achievements. This code has protected stakeholders’ 
rights during and after the bargaining process, and improved the quality of 
information available to all. It has improved the firms’ management quality, helped 
prevent high-risk behavior by managers, and allowed the most experienced workers to 
administer the firm.  
However, the law has demonstrated some shortcomings that must be improved on 
if the efficiency of the procedure is to be increased. For example, the law does not 
explicitly contemplate the ex-post efficiency condition, which has produced a large 
proportion of restructuring agreements for non-viable companies and the process of 
liquidation for those firms has taken more time than necessary. Because the law aims 
to preserve employment in ailing firms, reasons other than economic efficiency may 
be considered more important in deciding between restructuring or liquidation.  
In addition, the law is oriented to restructuring by regulating the bargaining 
process to encourage stakeholders to think more about the firm’s interest than their 
own; to give equal priority to all stakeholders; to reduce the minimum level of votes 
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needed to approve a restructuring plan; and to give veto power to minority groups 
interested in achieving a restructuring agreement.  
The law has been debtor-oriented because it eliminates sanctions on owners and 
managers responsible for the firm’s bankruptcy, allows them to maintain their posts 
during the bargaining process, and gives them voting and veto power. Also, like other 
liquidation procedures based on the French civil code, Law 550 gives less protection 
to creditors because, although it does not have an explicit priority order of payments, 
it does not guarantee that secured creditors are paid first (i.e., it does not follow the 
absolute-priority-of-claims rule). 
These shortcomings could potentially affect the ex-ante behavior of some agents, 
especially creditors, thereby reducing ex-ante efficiency. 
A new bankruptcy law for Colombia should focus on improving the ex-ante and 
ex-post efficiency of the bankruptcy procedures. These objectives can be achieved 
with the explicit inclusion of a rule that states the restructuring option must be chosen 
if, and only if, the going-concern value is greater than the liquidation value. Also, 
these objectives can be achieved by reducing the periods in each stage of the 
bargaining process and limiting the time allotted to respond to stakeholders’ protests.  
Moreover, the law can improve the procedure’s efficiency if it gives creditors and 
debtors equal roles in the bargaining process. For this, it is necessary to establish a 
pre-fixed rule that prioritizes the preservation of claims, spreads equal voting and veto 
power among stakeholders and restores sanctions to owners and managers who are 
responsible for the firm’s bankruptcy. It is also necessary to extend the Code of 
Corporate Conduct to the relationships between stakeholders outside the bargaining 
table.   
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 Law 550 has not been successful in attracting new capital to ailing firms during 
the restructuring processes. Almost all processes are based on rescheduling payments 
and/or the sale of assets, and only a small portion of the restructuring includes new 
money (from credits or shareholders’ capital), debt/equity swaps or bonds. Therefore, 
the bankruptcy mechanism must be complemented by other kinds of policies. For 
example, the government should encourage the use of debt-equity swaps through tax-
exemptions for investors who invest in the equity of restructuring companies, 
particularly small and medium-size firms. Also, the government should increase the 
information available to firms about credit lines that exist to provide funds for 
companies.    
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APPENDICE 
APPENDIX 1 
COMPANIES IN RESTRUCTURING OR LIQUIDATION PROCESSES 
 
The sample I constructed to analyze Law 550 is composed of 50 companies that 
approved restructuring agreements and 10 firms undergoing mandatory liquidation. In 
both cases, the companies were selected based on the composition of firm size and 
economic sector found in the Superintendence of Companies’ database. In the sample, I 
tried to keep the same proportion of large, medium, small and micro-size companies, as 
well as the proportion for each economic sector, found in the database. 
In the selection of large companies, I first included the most typical and emblematic 
Colombian companies in financial distress to include some elements of the Colombian 
economy into the analysis. Later, there was a random selection of companies. The sample 
for liquidation companies was also chosen randomly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 68
Name Assets (million pesos) Liabilities (million pesos) Equity (million pesos) Starting Date Signature Date Modification Date Size Economic Sector
1 Danaranjo S.A. 19,513.0 12,787.0 6,726.0 4/14/2000 11/14/2000 3/4/2002 Large Manufacturing
2 Hotel Santa Clara 54,097.0 41,162.0 12,935.0 4/15/2002 3/14/2003 Large Other Services
3 Colchones El Dorado S.A. 6,968.0 4,787.0 2,181.0 11/22/2001 7/15/2002 Large Manufacturing
4 Andes Television S.A. 2,694.0 2,027.0 667.0 11/7/2001 8/3/2002 Medium Transportation-communication
5 Cable Andino S.A. 12,037.0 8,575.0 3,462.0 7/19/2002 9/12/2003 Large Transportation-communication
6 Caribu internacional S.A. 5,813.0 12,809.0 -6,996.0 6/7/2000 3/2/2001 Large Other Services
7 Casa Color S.A. 27,738.0 26,762.0 976.0 5/18/2000 6/29/2001 Large Commerce
8 Urbanizacion Santa Barbara Central LTDA 14,948.0 12,655.0 2,293.0 2/9/2000 2/5/2002 Large Construction
9 Centro Ford y Chevrolet LTDA 404.0 223.0 181.0 7/10/2002 3/7/2003 Small Commerce
10 Club Social Tequendama 2,304.0 1,052.0 1,252.0 10/17/2001 6/6/2002 Medium Other Services
11 Hotel El Porton de Oviedo 11,093.0 3,140.0 7,953.0 4/17/2001 12/14/2001 Large Commerce
12 Educar S.A. 2,806.0 3,294.0 -488.0 3/2/2001 2/4/2003 Medium Commerce
13 Avicultura Tecnica S.A. 42,317.0 26,058.0 16,259.0 9/15/2003 12/30/2003 Large Manufacturing
14 Educar Venta Directa S.A. 5,237.0 5,923.0 -686.0 3/2/2001 2/4/2003 Large Manufacturing
15 Ingenieros y arquitectos consultores S.A. 2,561.0 4,368.0 -1,807.0 9/18/2000 5/25/2001 7/19/2001 Medium Construction
16 Productos Naturales de la Sabana S.A. 43,973.0 41,627.0 2,346.0 2/9/2000 12/1/2000 Large Manufacturing
17 MF Publicidad y Mercadeo S.A. 934.0 782.0 152.0 8/10/2000 4/16/2001 Small Other Services
18 Alberto Ochoa y Cia LTDA 2,612.0 1,006.0 1,606.0 2/9/2000 2/19/2001 Medium Commerce
19 Comlasa de Colombia S.A. 2,772.0 2,418.0 354.0 3/28/2001 11/27/2001 Medium Other Services
20 Arotec Colombiana S.A. 2,967.0 2,681.0 286.0 10/11/2000 6/8/2001 9/3/2003 Medium Commerce
21 Manufacturas Bonny LTDA 101.0 212.0 -111.0 3/8/2000 7/27/2000 Micro Manufacturing
22 Fibratolima S.A. 110,947.0 76,575.0 34,372.0 4/18/2002 6/21/2003 Large Manufacturing
23 Plastihogar S.A. 8,965.0 15,304.0 -6,339.0 5/9/2002 1/14/2003 Large Manufacturing
24 Automotores del Oriente LTDA 302.0 458.0 -156.0 9/27/2000 5/25/2001 Small Commerce
25 Pizano S.A. 231,916.0 154,356.0 77,560.0 11/17/2000 3/22/2002 Large Manufacturing
26 Mundiven S.A. 1,937.0 2,691.0 -754.0 1/29/2001 9/21/2001 Medium Construction
27 Remel LTDA 1,260.0 1,063.0 197.0 12/14/2000 6/28/2001 Small Commerce
28 Icobandas S.A. 4,520.0 3,840.0 680.0 5/2/2000 12/5/2000 Large Manufacturing
29 Derilac S.A. 5,656.0 2,211.0 3,445.0 3/5/2001 10/26/2001 12/23/2003 Large Manufacturing
30 Aceites comestibles del Sinu S.A. 17,217.0 7,987.0 9,230.0 9/15/2003 12/30/2003 Large Agriculture
31 Nutrilisto de Colombia S.A. 38,136.0 24,458.0 13,678.0 9/15/2003 12/30/2003 Large Manufacturing
32 Fabrica de Hilados y Tejidos del Hato S.A. Fabricato 451,987.0 323,005.0 128,982.0 3/3/2000 11/7/2000 Large Manufacturing
33 Grupo Electrico S.A. 413.0 513.0 -100.0 3/18/2002 11/7/2002 Small Other Services
34 Transportes Rapido Ochoa S.A. 8,115.0 7,089.0 1,026.0 2/9/2000 2/19/2001 Large Transportation-communication
35 Tecnipotencias  Tecpo LTDA 841.0 781.0 60.0 5/19/2000 1/19/2001 9/28/2001 Small Construction
36 Agropecuaria La Laguna LTDA 811.0 508.0 303.0 9/11/2000 5/14/2001 11/5/2003 Small Agriculture
37 Puntocol LTDA 722.0 845.0 -123.0 11/1/2002 12/1/2003 Small Manufacturing
38 Educar Editores S.A. 8,007.0 5,816.0 2,191.0 3/2/2001 2/4/2003 Large Manufacturing
39 Educar Cultural S.A. 17,262.0 8,588.0 8,674.0 3/2/2001 2/4/2003 Large Manufacturing
40 Ingenieros Constructores Gayco S.A. 36,205.0 19,851.0 16,354.0 12/20/2000 12/12/2001 4/5/2002 Large Construction
41 Expreso Bolivariano S.A. 34,212.0 38,117.0 -3,905.0 2/14/2002 6/6/2003 Large Transportation-communication
42 Industria Colombiana de Harinas S.A. 5,672.0 3,841.0 1,831.0 10/11/2000 6/6/2001 Large Manufacturing
43 Laboratorio Smart S.A. 6,802.0 3,669.0 3,133.0 7/6/2000 3/2/2001 Large Manufacturing
44 Jeans and Jackets S.A. 14,861.0 12,405.0 2,456.0 1/15/2002 6/12/2003 Large Manufacturing
45 Agroindustrial San Jose 2,959.0 1,699.0 1,260.0 6/23/2000 2/19/2001 4/16/2003 Medium Agriculture
46 Laboratorios Cosmeticos Vogue-Visee S.A. 23,047.0 23,989.0 -942.0 8/4/2000 11/24/2000 9/8/2003 Large Manufacturing
47 Fundacion Abood Shaio 80,298.0 37,754.0 42,544.0 4/14/2000 11/27/2000 12/5/2002 Large Other Services
48 Conconcreto S.A. 145,854.0 90,054.0 55,800.0 8/30/2002 12/18/2003 Large Construction
49 Compania Colombiana de Tejidos S.A. 762,672.0 491,692.0 270,980.0 3/15/2000 2/20/2001 Large Manufacturing
50 Acerias Paz del Rio S.A. 570,713.0 329,373.0 241,340.0 6/23/2000 7/18/2003 Large Manufacturing
Table A.1.1.:Companies with Restructuring Agreements
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Name Assets (million pesos) Liabilities (million pesos) Equity (million pesos) Starting Date Signature Date Modification Date Liquidation Date Size Economic Sector
1 Luis Soto Proyectos S.A. 1,240.0 778.0 462.0 4/12/2000 10/31/2000 10/11/2001 9/19/2002 Small Construction
2 Compania productora de Television S.A. 2,852.0 3,230.0 -378.0 8/4/2000 3/30/2001 4/23/2003 Medium Transportation-communication
3 Alimentos Nacionales Pinky 6,414.0 11,711.0 -5,297.0 12/14/2000 8/10/2001 12/27/2002 Large N.A.
4 Identicar de Colombia LTDA 439.0 928.0 -489.0 2/9/2000 10/9/2000 9/10/2002 Small Other services
5 Fabrica de Calzado Hevea C.I.S.A. 4,106.0 3,941.0 165.0 12/1/2000 7/30/2001 9/12/2002 Large Manufacturing
6 La Moda Alemana y Compania LTDA 693.0 833.0 -140.0 1/29/2001 10/1/2001 8/12/2002 1/29/2003 Small Commerce
7 Alfatecnica S.A. 2,562.0 3,520.0 -958.0 9/11/2000 5/18/2001 1/23/2004 Medium Commerce
8 En Vivo S.A. 10,904.0 10,917.0 -13.0 5/23/2000 1/25/2001 6/22/2001 Large Transportation-communication
9 Compania colombiana de Citricos S.A. 2,160.0 3,516.0 -1,356.0 4/30/2001 5/21/2002 4/23/2003 Medium Manufacturing
10 Florecer LTDA 1,136.0 719.0 417.0 2/27/2001 11/4/2001 10/3/2003 Small Agriculture
Table A.1.2.:Companies in Liquidation
 
Source: Superintendence of Companies. 
Exchange Rate: COL$2705 pesos/US$ dollar (2004). 
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APPENDIX 2 
STAKEHOLDER COALITIONS TO APPROVE RESTRUCTURING 
AGREEMENTS 
To analyze which groups of stakeholders had key roles in approving restructuring 
agreements, I arranged coalitions of those groups that could approve the agreement 
together. For instance, if there was a case in which all groups had voting rights, but only 
some of them actually voted positive, I assembled a coalition formed only by those 
groups that voted positive and the sum of whose voting rights was more than 50% plus 
one of the total voting rights.   
Table A.2.1. shows cases in which all stakeholders’ groups had voting rights. The rows 
show the possible relevant coalitions (among three groups, as Law 550 states) that were 
able to approve the agreement. The columns show the participation of each stakeholders’ 
group in all coalitions. 
Table A.2.1.: Coalitions among 5 Groups with Voting Rights 
Coalitions Shareholders Workers Government Secured Creditors Unsecured Creditors Total
All stakeholders 6 6 6 6 6 6
W-G-SC-UC 4 4 4 4 4
S-G-SC-UC 5 5 5 5 5
S-W-SC-UC 5 5 5 5 5
S-W-G-UC 1 1 1 1 1
S-W-G-SC 1 1 1 1 1
G-SC-UC 1 1 1 1
W-SC-UC 4 4 4 4
W-G-UC 1 1 1 1
W-G-SC 
S-SC-UC 2 2 2 2
S-G-UC 3 3 3 3
S-G-SC 
S-W-UC 2 2 2 2
S-W-SC 3 3 3 3
S-W-G 1 1 1 1
Total 29 28 23 31 34 39  
Source: Restructuring-agreements files. Calculations by the author. 
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S: Shareholders 
W: Current and Retired Workers 
G: Government and Social Security Institutions 
SC: Secured Creditors 
UC: Unsecured Creditors 
Table A.2.2. shows the cases in which only four stakeholders’ groups had voting rights. 
The rows show the group that does not have voting rights. The columns show the 
participation of each group in each coalition. 
Table A.2.2.: Coalitions among 4 Groups with Voting Rights 
Shareholders Workers Government Secured Creditors Unsecured Creditors Total
No Workers 1 2 5 5 5
No Government 1 1 1 1 1
No S. Creditors 1 1 1 1
No U. Creditors 1 1 1 1
Total 4 2 3 7 7 8
       Source: Restructuring-agreements files. Calculations by the author. 
There is one case in which only three groups had voting rights. The coalition was 
Shareholders, Government and Unsecured Creditors. Finally, there is one case with two 
groups with voting rights. The coalition was Shareholders and Secured Creditors. 
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APPENDIX 3 
RESTRUCTURING CONDITIONS WITH STAKEHOLDERS 
This Appendix describes the main restructuring conditions that each company agreed to 
with each group of stakeholders. The columns show the conditions of the time-limit for 
debt rescheduling (in months), the dead time of payments (in months) and other 
considerations, like debt-equity swaps, payment with firm’s assets, better payment 
conditions, etc. The numbers on each row represent each firm, as in the tables in 
Appendix 1. 
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Table A.3.1.: Restructuring with Current and Retired Workers 
Firm Time-limit Dead Period Interest Rate
1 12 No annual increment of salaries
Extralegal benefits have to be 
paid in 8 months without no 
increment
2 15 Civil Law
3 N.A. 36 CPI
4
5
6 18 Civil Law
7
8 0.5 CPI
9 12 DTF+9%
10 12 Civil Law
11
12 4
13 6
14 4
15 12 12
16 0
17
18 48 24 DTF+4.5%
19 36 12 CPI
20 12 DTF+4%
21
22 24
23 60 24 Civil Law
24 0
25
26
27 3
28 6 CPI
29 0.5 0.5
30 6
31 6 DTF
32 0
33 0
34
35 12
36 2 2
37 54 48 CPI
38 8 4
39 8 4
40 4 4
41 0
42
43 12 12 CPI
44 24 6 DTF
45 12
46 4
47 1
48 0.3 DTF
49
50 84 24 CPI No increment of extralegal benefits Debt-to-Equity Swap
Special Considerations
Creditors will give new money to the firm. These debts will be 
paid 10 days after that this money enters to the firm's 
accounts.
Payment with the firm's assets or bonds
Payment when there be cash flow
Debt-to-Equity Swap
Debts will be paid when they be caused
Interest Rate cannot be less than CPI g.r. and more than 
CPI+7%
Foreign Debts Interest Rate: LIBOR+4%
Payment when there be cash flow
Payment when there be cash flow
Payment when there be cash flow
Payment when there be cash flow
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Table A.3.2.: Restructuring with Government-Fiscal Institutions 
Firm Time Limit Dead Period Interes Rate
1 36 1.56% per month
2 42 DTF
3 60 24 CPI
4 18 CPI
5 24 24 DTF
6 84 24 Tax Law
7
8
9 2
10 36 6 DTF
11 36 24 DTF
12 24 DTF+5%
13 6 DTF
14 24 DTF+5%
15 24 24 DTF+5%
16 7 DTF
17 18 12 DTF
18 54 48 DTF+4.5%
19 36 12 Increasing*
20 12 DTF+4%
21
22 120 24 DTF
23 84 60 Tax Law
24 12 6 Tax Law
25 60 CPI
26 48 6 Increasing*
27 42 Increasing*
28
29 7 7 Tax Law
30 9 DTF
31 9 DTF
32 120 24 Increasing*
33
34
35 72 Increasing*
36 6
37 N.A. 60 CPI
38 24 DTF+5%
39 24 DTF+5%
40 4 4
41 Tax Law
42
43 60 7 CPI
44 30 24 Increasing*
45 24 16 DTF
46 84 DTF+3%
47 36 2.26% per month
48 0.3 DTF
49 120 24 Increasing*
50 120 24 CPI
Special Considerations
Payment with firm's assets
Payment with firm's assets
Interest Rate cannot be less than CPI g.r. and more than 
CPI+7%
*CPI during the first year, DTF the next years
Foreign Debts Interest Rate: LIBOR+4%
* First 3 years: DTF, next 3 years: DTF+6%, more than 6 
years:DTF+5%
* First 3 years: DTF, next 3 years: DTF+6%, more than 6 
years:DTF+15%
* First 3 years: DTF, next 3 years: DTF+6%, next 3 years: 
DTF+15% and last year DTF+30
* First 3 years: DTF, next 3 years: DTF+6%, more than 6 
years:DTF+15%
Payment with firm's assets
Creditors will give new money to the firm. These debts will be 
paid 10 days after that this money enters to the firm's accounts.
* First 3 years: DTF, next 3 years: DTF+1.06%, next 3 years: 
DTF+1.15%, last year:DTF+1.3%
* First 4 years: DTF, next year: DTF+6%
Payment with firm's assets
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Table A.3.3.: Restructuring with Social Security Institutions 
Firm Time Limit Dead Period Interes Rate
1 60
2
3 60 36 CPI
4
5
6
7 60 24
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17 84 36 Increasing*
18 48 24 DTF+4.5%
19 36 24 Increasing*
20 12 DTF+4%
21
22 24 Civil Law
23 36 24 Tax Law
24 12 6 N.A.
25
26
27 60 12 Increasing*
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38 24 DTF+5%
39 24 DTF+5%
40 4 4
41
42
43 CPI
44 24 6 DTF
45 24 16 DTF
46 24 12 CPI
47
48 0.3 Civil Law
49
50 84 24 CPI
Special Considerations
* First 3 years: DTF, next 4 years: DTF+6%
Interest Rate cannot be less than CPI g.r. and more than 
CPI+7%
*CPI during the first year, DTF the next years
Foreign Debts Interest Rate: LIBOR+4%
Payment with Firm's assets
* First 3 years: DTF, next 3 years: DTF+6%, more than 6 
years:DTF+15%
Creditors will give new money to the firm. These debts will be 
paid 10 days after that this money enters to the firm's accounts.
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Table A.3.4.: Restructuring with Secured Creditors 
Firm Time Limit Dead Period Interes Rate
1 84 36 CPI
2 240 144 DTF+6%
3 120 96 CPI
4
5
6 180 50% of CPI
7 72 12 Increasing*
8 120 CPI
9 84 12 DTF+3%
10 180 36 DTF
11 6
12 120 Increasing*
13 180 48 DTF
14 120 Increasing*
15 96 84 CPI
16 60 12 Increasing*
17 144 24 10% UVR
18 69 54 DTF+4.5%
19 84 48 Increasing*
20 48 12 Increasing*
21
22 228 120 DTF
23 192 72 CPI
24 60 60 N.A.
25 180 96 Increasing* *First 8 years: 0%, next years: CPI+5% Debt-to-Equity Swap 
26 48 Increasing*
27 84 24 Increasing*
28 48 24 Increasing*
29 120 48 CPI
30 180 48 DTF
31 180 48 DTF
32 240 60 50%DTF
33 24 24 CPI
34
35 72 CPI
36 24 12 CPI
37 60 N.A.
38 120 24 Increasing*
39 120 24 Increasing*
40 114 30 N.A.
41
42 102 30 DTF+2%
43 N.A. CPI
44 90 48 DTF
45 84 36 Increasing*
46 84 DTF
47 108 60 DTF+2%
48 132 132 DTF
49 240 120 50% DTF
50 120 48 CPI
Special Considerations
*First two years: CPI+2%, next two years:CPI+6.5%, last two 
years: CPI+8%
Payment with firm's assets
Payment with firm's assets
Payment with firm's assets
*First 4 years: DTF+1%, next 2 years: DTF+2%, next 2 years: 
DTF+3%, last 2 years: DTF+5%
Payment with firm's assets
*Increasing rate from DTF+1% to DTF+5%
* First 2 months: DTF, next 10 months: DTF+2%, last 4 years: 
DTF+5%
*CPI during the first year, DTF the next years
* First 3 years: DTF, next years: DTF+5%
* First 3 years: DTF, next 3 years: DTF+6%, more than 6 
years:DTF+15%
* First year: DTF+4%, next 2 years: DTF+3%, last year: 
DTF+5%
* First 4 years: DTF+4%, next years: DTF+5%
Posible Debt-to-Equity Swap, up to 60% of the total debt
Payment with firm's assets
A third part can pay the firm's debts with secured creditors
*Increasing rate from DTF+1% to DTF+5%
*Increasing rate from DTF+1% to DTF+5%
Creditors will give new money to the firm. Payments with firm's 
*Increasing rate from DTF+1% to DTF+5%
Payment with firm's assets or bonds
Payment with firm's assets
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Table A.3.5.: Restructuring with Unsecured Creditors 
Firm Time Limit Dead Period Interes Rate
1 60 24 CPI
2 84 0
3 120 108 CPI
4 42
5 120 24 DTF
6
7 24 0
8
9 84 12 DTF+3%
10 84 48 DTF
11 60 0
12 120 36 N.A.
13 N.A.
14 120 36 N.A.
15 N.A. 108
16
17 84 60 DTF
18 96 69 DTF+4.5%
19 84 48 Increasing*
20 60 24 Increasing*
21
22
23
24 60 N.A. N.A.
25 180 96 Increasing* *First 8 years: 0%, next years: CPI+5%
Debt-to-Equity Swap with better 
payment conditions
26 60 Increasing*
* First 3 years: DTF, next 3 
years: DTF+6%, more than 
6 years:DTF+15%
Prioritary creditors time-limit: 2 
years
27 12 0%
28 6 CPI
29 48 12 CPI
30
31
32
33 24 24 CPI
34
35 N.A. N.A. CPI
36 N.A. 36 CPI
37 96 72 N.A.
38 120 36
39 120 36
40 114 30
41
42
43 7 7 CPI
44 90 48 DTF
45 84 36 Increasing*
46 24 12
47 48 12 CPI
48 144 132 DTF
49 240 120 50% DTF Debt to Equity Swaps Reduction of time-limit to 120 months for new loans
50 120 48 CPI
Special Considerations
For debts less than COL$2 million pesos, payment must be 
when the agreement is signed
Debts less than COL$2 million: time-limit 1 year; debts between 
COL$ 2 million and COL$60 million: time-limit 2 years
Debt-to-Equity Swap
Payment with firm's assets
* Previous conditions are hold after agreement
*CPI during the first year, DTF the next years
* First year: DTF+4%, next 2 years: DTF+3%, last year: 
DTF+5%
Debt less than COL$3 million: payment just after the agreement 
is signed; debts between 3 and 10 million: time-limit 1 year
Debts less than COL$500 thousand pesos: time-limit 2 years; 
between COL$500 thousand and COL$6 million: time-limit 3 
years
Payment with firm's assets
Payment with firm's assets
Payment with firm's assets
Payment with firm's assets
New money from a client
Better conditions to those suppliers with key output for the firm
Debt to Equity Swaps
Debt-to-Equity Swap
If unsecured creditors hold their loans, the firm will start to pay 
after 6 years the agreement is signed.
Debt less than COL$10 million: time-limit 7 months
*Increasing rate from DTF+1% to DTF+5%
Payment with firm's assets
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Table A.3.6.: Restructuring with Shareholders 
Firm Time Limit Dead Period Interes Rate
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29 48 12 CPI
30
31
32
33
34
35
36 CPI
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46 84 CPI
47
48
49
50
New money from shareholders
Special Considerations
New money from shareholders and payment with bonds
New money from shareholders and issuing of shares
Payment with firm's assets
Payment with firm's assets
Payment with firm's assets
Payment at the end of the process, no interest payments
Payment at the end of the process, no interest payments
Only dividends payment
Payment at the end of the process, no interest payments
Payment at the end of the process, no interest payments
Payment at the end of the process, no interest payments
No dividends payment
Payment at the end of the process
Payment at the end of the process
Payment at the end of the process with bonds
No dividends payment  
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Firms in Liquidation Process 
Firm Time-limit Dead Period Interest Rate
1 10
2
3 12 12 Previous to the agreement
4
5 60 12 0%
6 19 15 CPI+2%
7 72 24 DTF+5%
8
9 3 0%
10 3 0%
Firm Time Limit Dead Period Interes Rate
1 0.3 Tax Law
2
3 60 12 DTF
4 22 12 Tax Law
5 48 CPI
6 39 28 CPI+2%
7 72 24 DTF+5%
8
9 12 DTF
10 36 CPI
Firm Time Limit Dead Period Interes Rate
1
2
3 12 12 Previous to the agreement
4 24 Tax Law
5 30 6 CPI
6
7 72 24 DTF+5%
8
9
10 36 CPI
Firm Time Limit Dead Period Interes Rate
1 48 DTF
2
3 96 60 DTF+6%
4 60 36 CPI
5 84 36 CPI
6
7 72 24 DTF+5%
8
9 96 DTF+2%
10 48 12 CPI
Firm Time Limit Dead Period Interes Rate
1 48 DTF
2 48 12 N.A.
3 96 60 DTF+6%
4 60 36 CPI Payment with firm's assets For debts less than COL$ 1 million: time-limit 24 months
5 84 36 CPI
6 60 51 0%
7
8
9 96 12 DTF+3%
10 24 0%
Table A.3.7.: Restructuring with Workers and Retired People
Special Considerations
Table A.3.8.: Restructuring with Government-Fiscal Institutions
Special Considerations
33% of debt must be paid just after the agreement is signed
50% with services (TV advertisement), 50% with cash
Table A.3.9.: Restructuring with Social Security Institutions
Special Considerations
50% with services (TV advertisement), 50% with cash
Table A.3.10.: Restructuring with Secured Creditors
Special Considerations
For debts less than COL$ 1 million: time-limit 24 months
50% with services (TV advertisement), 50% with cash
Payment with firm's assets
Input Suppliers: time-limit: 54 months, interest rate: 0%
Table A.3.11.: Restructuring with Unsecured Creditors
Special Considerations
50% with services (TV advertisement), 50% with cash
Payment with firm's assets
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APPENDIX 4 
Table A.4.1.: Present Value and Piecemeal Value of Firms in Restructuring or 
Liquidation Processes 
Present Value Piece-Meal value
In Restructuring Process
Aceites Sin? 19 667,258 2,286,603 no
Nutrilisto 19 8,130,420 9,699,541 no
Vogue 8 17,705,524 -7,790,367 yes
Alberto Ochoa 9 52,714,977 1,028,598 yes
R? ido Ochoa 9 52,714,977 357,211 yes
Icobandas 7 11,331,368 4,786,144 yes
Avites 18 2,662,092 22,921,328 no
Danaranjo 10 10,373 9,700,991 no
Carib? Internacional 15 4,765,004 -1,777,351 yes
Casa Color 11 1,440,670 657,014 yes
Ingenieros Consultores S.A. 8 1,741,982 64,236 yes
Arotec 6 1,687,297 316,409 yes
Ingenieros constructores GAYCO S.A. 9 19,779,501 17,546,303 yes
Automotora de Oriente 6 90,007 -348,323 yes
Coltejer 23 364,353,235 258,608,367 yes
Hotel Port?  de Oviedo 9 1,972,279 7,504,931 no
Andes TV 4 2,524,386 345,932 yes
Derilac 7 2,483,517 3,723,670 no
Hotel Sta. Clara 24 117,607,861 11,930,136 yes
Colchones El Dorado 11 40,636,788 1,754,264 yes
Ford y Chevrolet 11 2,804 157,694 no
Educar S.A. 11 4,385,019 -872,547 yes
Educar Venta Directa 11 19,340,794 -3,710,367 yes
Educar Editores 11 67,125,482 619,597 yes
Educar Cultural 11 67,125,482 3,918,048 yes
Plastihogar 11 12,255,961 -8,009,381 yes
Pizano 14 117,031,064 96,647,929 yes
Jeans and Jackets 6 12,704,808 423,321 yes
Agroindustrial San Jos? 10 1,635,394 -180,060 yes
Conconcreto 13 29,779 49,314,437 no
Mundiven 7 278,689 -940,780 yes
In Liquidation
Luis Soto Proyectos 5 236,003 420,420 no
Alimentos Nacionales PINKY 11 8,138,973 -4,857,471 yes
Fabrica de Calzado Hevea 7 460,548 -985,819 yes
La moda alemana 15 3,662,352 -847,151 yes
Alfat? nica 6 3,097,107 -958,000 yes
Length of 
Agreement (years) (thousand of COL$ pesos) Present Value>Equity Value
Source: Restructuring-agreements files. Calculations by the author. 
The DTF interest rate used to calculate the present value of these companies was the observed DTF interest rate from 2000 and 2004 
(12.1%, 12.4%, 8.9%, 7.8% and 7.9%, respectively). For the next years, I assumed no large changes in that interest rate, so it is equal 
to the 2004 DTF’s interest rate. It should be pointed out that these rates are less than those used in the forecasting process by the 
companies’ managers. 
 
 
